109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
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Alexander S. Belenky.
Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.
Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.
Myachin A. L.
In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.
Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.
Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.
1. Speaker: Yulia Zhestkova (HSE)
Topic: " Catch Me if You Can: Election Manipulation in Non-Democracies"
2. Speaker: Ilya Kozis (HSE)
Topic: " Brain Drain in Non-Democratic Regimes "
Empirical studies suggest that human capital is one of the determinants of economic growth. However, political aspects of human capital formation are largely neglected in theoretical literature. In my paper, I am trying to incorporate possibility of "brain drain" into a model of authoritarian regime, presented in the book of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson "Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy." In particular, I use a model with three income groups, where elites dictate their policy to other citizens, while poor and middle class, the latter is also considered to be educated and to have a non-negative impact on income of all citizens, can undertake a revolution. Besides that, educated group can also choose to migrate. Presented model, unlike already existing, fits in with such events as Huguenot Exodus from France in 1685, and Expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492. Also, to a limited extent I was able to show, that "brain drain", as a result of more redistributive policy, rather than the ideal policy of elites, is not less likely to happen in societies, where inequality between poor and rich is larger.