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Aleskerov F. T., Shvydun S., Meshcheryakova N.
CRC Press, 2022.
Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.
International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.
In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.
Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.
math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].
Abstract:
The paper analyzes the effect of incentives regulation, when the yardstick competition approach is supplemented with a performance tax on providers. In an application to prospective payments in health care in the U.S. and Japan, we show differential effects of value-based purchasing, when price-setting is related to benchmark values of quality measures or length-of-stay. The predictions of our theoretical model, as well as empirical results offer persuasive evidence that unintended effects appear for best-performing hospitals. Patient experience/clinical-process-of-care measures significantly decrease in the top percentiles of the U.S. hospitals owing to the reform. Similarly, length of stay significantly increases for most diagnosis-related groups at Japanese hospitals in percentiles with the lowest length of stay. A natural experiment aimed at best-practice rate-setting diminishes the undesired effects of the reform.