Inna Zaitseva studied players' incentives to exert different levels of effort in different games. The hypothesis of her research suggests that players can express their loyalty to the values of their club by increasing the level of effort in matches, which are considered as principal for the club. One of the explicit criteria for principal matches in football is a derby status of a game. This research demonstrates, that players in Bundesliga in season 2017-2018 exerted a greater level of effort in home derby games, which supports the idea of players’ loyalty to club’s values.
The phrase «He who owns the information, owns the world» is familiar to us all. However, is completeness of information always a good thing? It turns out that in the principal-agent model this is not so. Transparency can decrease the willingness of agents to act in the most efficient way and provide incentives to behave in order to put themselves in a favorable light. The professor of Warwick University Niall Hughes spoke about this in more detail, presenting an article «How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment».
On September 20 a research seminar on political economy took place at HSE. Galina Besstremyannaya (Lead research fellow, Center for Economic and Financial Research) spoke on 'The adverse effects of incentives regulation in health care'.
