• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site
Contacts

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru; shatskaya@hse.ru

Administration
School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Svetlana Shatskaya
Senior Administrator Svetlana Shatskaya
Article
An Approach to Estimating the Economic Expediency of Developing a New Cargo Transport Hub by a Regional Public Administration

Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.

International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.

Book chapter
A note on subspaces of fixed grades in Clifford algebras

Shirokov D.

In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.

Working paper
On compact 4th order finite-difference schemes for the wave equation

Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.

math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].

Tag "incentives" – News

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Inna Zaitseva (HSE) about the “Moneyball” phenomenon and players' incentives in football

Inna Zaitseva studied players' incentives to exert different levels of effort in different games. The hypothesis of her research suggests that players can express their loyalty to the values of their club by increasing the level of effort in matches, which are considered as principal for the club. One of the explicit criteria for principal matches in football is a derby status of a game. This research demonstrates, that players in Bundesliga in season 2017-2018 exerted a greater level of effort in home derby games, which supports the idea of players’ loyalty to club’s values.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Niall Hughes (Warwick University) about the Information Aggregation

The phrase «He who owns the information, owns the world» is familiar to us all. However, is completeness of information always a good thing? It turns out that in the principal-agent model this is not so. Transparency can decrease the willingness of agents to act in the most efficient way and provide incentives to behave in order to put themselves in a favorable light. The professor of Warwick University Niall Hughes spoke about this in more detail, presenting an article «How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment».

Galina Besstremyannaya Presented the Report on a research seminar on political economy

On September 20 a research seminar on political economy took place at HSE. Galina Besstremyannaya (Lead research fellow, Center for Economic and Financial Research)  spoke on 'The adverse effects of incentives regulation in health care'.