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Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru

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Article
Fast Fourier solvers for the tensor product high-order FEM for a Poisson type equation

Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.

Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.

Book chapter
Innovation Development: Review and Estimation of Heterogeneity

Myachin A. L.

In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.

Working paper
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Denis Ivanov (NRU HSE) about the social trust

Topic: "Do institutions cause social trust? Evidence from an institutional reform"

Interpersonal trust has a great impact on life quality and economic development. What are its origins? Why are people in some countries inclined to trust each other while in others they are not? In his work "Do institutions cause social trust? Evidence from an institutional reform» NRU HSE research fellow Denis Ivanov told us how police reform and control of corruption can influence the level of social trust.

Abstract:

I attempt to disentangle a problem of causality between institutional quality and interpersonal trust using evidence from a natural experiment: mid-2000s institutional reforms in the post-Soviet nation of Georgia. The reforms following the 2003 Rose Revolution were swift and extensive, aiming mostly at combating corruption and organized crime, improving law enforcement and economic liberalization. At the same time, the neighboring nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics with cultural and economic background similar to the Georgian one, experienced no such change, thus becoming credible counterfactuals to Georgia. To reduce unobservable heterogeneity between Georgia as a treatment group, and Armenia and Azerbaijanas a control group, I exploit the fact that republics borders during the Soviet era did not always reflected the settlement patterns of ethnic groups, thus creating a number of minorities separated from their ethnic kins by arbitrary borders that were internal within the USSR but have become international after the independence. In this particular case, Georgia has several districts with predominantly Armenian and Azeri population spanning along its border with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Comparing people of the same ethnic group on both sides of the border allows concentrating on differences in governance and formal institutions and to diminish possible confounding effect of culture-related heterogeneity.
Applying regression discontinuity design to the data from Life in Transition and Caucasian Barometer surveys, I find that Armenian and Azeri residents of Georgia have greater level of interpersonal trust than their counterparts in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Perceptions of corruption and rule of law are likely channels of influence.
I attempt to disentangle a problem of causality between institutional quality and interpersonal trust using evidence from a natural experiment: mid-2000s institutional reforms in the post-Soviet nation of Georgia. The reforms following the 2003 Rose Revolution were swift and extensive, aiming mostly at combating corruption and organized crime, improving law enforcement and economic liberalization. At the same time, the neighboring nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics with cultural and economic background similar to the Georgian one, experienced no such change, thus becoming credible counterfactuals to Georgia. To reduce unobservable heterogeneity between Georgia as a treatment group, and Armenia and Azerbaijanas a control group, I exploit the fact that republics borders during the Soviet era did not always reflected the settlement patterns of ethnic groups, thus creating a number of minorities separated from their ethnic kins by arbitrary borders that were internal within the USSR but have become international after the independence. In this particular case, Georgia has several districts with predominantly Armenian and Azeri population spanning along its border with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Comparing people of the same ethnic group on both sides of the border allows concentrating on differences in governance and formal institutions and to diminish possible confounding effect of culture-related heterogeneity.
Applying regression discontinuity design to the data from Life in Transition and Caucasian Barometer surveys, I find that Armenian and Azeri residents of Georgia have greater level of interpersonal trust than their counterparts in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Perceptions of corruption and rule of law are likely channels of influence.



the joint seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy, International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interaction was held April 18.