109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Alexander S. Belenky.
Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.
Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.
Myachin A. L.
In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.
Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.
Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.
Topic: " Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup "
Media freedom is a problem for any dictator as it resolves collective action problem in protests. However, a dictator might allow media freedom if there is a threat of a palace coup, the most frequent end of an autocratic leader tenure. We use a global game approach to analyze a situation, in which the incumbent leader trades off the possibility of protest against him and the possibility of protests aimed to restore his power if he is dismissed in a coup. Thus, media freedom serves as an ex ante protection for such a dictator, and the higher is the probability of a coup, the more media freedom the dictator would tolerate.
the seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy was held on June 26.
Moderators: Alexei Zakharov (HSE), Konstantin Sonin (HSE, The University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy)