• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru

School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Anastasia Lomakina
Senior Administrator Anastasia Lomakina
Fast Fourier solvers for the tensor product high-order FEM for a Poisson type equation

Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.

Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.

Book chapter
Analysis of Disputed Territories in the Barents Sea

Demin S. S., Shvydun S.

In bk.: Group Decision and Negotiation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective: 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2020, Toronto, ON, Canada, June 7–11, 2020, Proceedings. Vol. 388. Springer, 2020. P. 32-44.

Working paper
On the dual and inverse problems of scheduling problems with minimizing the maximum job penalty

Alexander A. Lazarev, Frank Werner, Nikolay Pravdivets.

Preprint 09/ 19, FMA, OvGU Magdeburg, 2019,. Preprint 09/ 19, FMA, OvGU Magdeburg, 2019,. Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, 2019

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Michele Valsecchi (NES) about the Impact of Sanctions on Elections

Michele Valsecchi (NES) showed that economic sanctions are not an effective tool for reaching one of their primary goals and can actually backfire

Topic: To Russia with Love? The Impact of Sanctions on Elections


Do economic sanctions weaken the support for incumbent governments? To answer this question, we focus on the sanctions imposed on Russia after 2014 and estimate their effect on voting behavior in both presidential and parliamentary elections. For identification, we use cross-regional variation in (pre-determined) trade exposure to sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries and before-after voting data at both regional and district level. The sanctions caused an increase in support for the incumbent. Around 39 percent of the increase in the vote shares of the incumbent president and party can be explained by sanctions. This result is robust to alternative measures of sanction exposure, including a measure of trade loss, i.e., the difference between observed trade flows and counter-factual trade flows computed via a full-general-equilibrium gravity model. Absence of pre-trends, as well as several placebo estimations, support the validity of the identification assumption. We then explore several potential mechanisms, including propaganda, electoral fraud as well as standard demand-supply effects. Overall, while it is hard to evaluate all the potential motives that sanctioning countries might have had, our results suggest that economic sanctions are not an effective tool for reaching one of their primary goals and can actually backfire.

the joint seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy, International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interaction (NES CSDSI) was held on March 12.

Moderators: Alexei Zakharov (HSE), Konstantin Sonin (HSE, The University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy)