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Tag "conferences & seminars" – News

Our faculty visited Arctic

October 13-19, 2019 in Longyearbyen, Spitsbergen, the SVF-8063 School of Society and Advanced Technology in the Arctic, organized by the Arctic University of Norway (UiT), was held. Senior colleagues and research assistants of the Higher School of Economics participated in it as students and teachers. There were also specialists and students from other countries. A number of disciplines were in the training course, including mathematics and data analysis. This is the second school of the “Arctic project” of the HSE DeCAn lab -the first one was held in 2018 in Tromsø, Norway.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Laurent Weill (University of Strasbourg) about the preemptive and counter offers in games theory

Laurent Weill (University of Strasbourg) examined the hypothesis that characterisitics of the dictator influence on the foreign investors.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Kemal Kivanc Akoz (HSE) about the preemptive and counter offers in games theory

Kemal Kivanc Akoz (HSE) examined usage of preemptive and counter offers in multiagent games with full and partial information.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Leonid Polishchuk (HSE) about the differences to the political environments at the time of reforms

Leonid Polishchuk (HSE) traced differences to the political environments at the time of reforms, when restriction of checks and balances was considered instrumental to expediting unpopular transformations and protecting the reforms from populist backlash.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Michele Valsecchi (NES) about the Impact of Sanctions on Elections

Michele Valsecchi (NES) showed that economic sanctions are not an effective tool for reaching one of their primary goals and can actually backfire

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Eugenia Chernina (HSE) about actual and perceived place in the income distribution

Eugenia Chernina (HSE) explored how far individuals’ perceptions deviate from the true level of inequality and what factors shape the divergence.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Aleksey Oshchepkov (HSE) about Network Corruption

Aleksey Oshchepkov explored the network (or parochial) corruption which is conditional on the social connections between bureaucrats and private agents. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) which covers all post-socialist countries? Aleksey found that network corruption is more persistent over time, less related to contemporary national socio-economic and institutional characteristics and has stronger historical roots than market corruption

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Dmitry Veselov (HSE) about migration of Russian settlers and the legacy of interregional development in Kazakhstan

Dmitry Veselov explored the effect of migration of Russian settlers on the intra-regional development in Kazakhstan using the 1897 census dataset of the Russian Empire and modern economic data to provide links between the density of the Russian population in Kazakhstan and the current level of economic development.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Koen Schoors (Ghent University) about the Generalized Trust and Preferences for Redistribution and Institutions

Koen Schoors studied how institutional quality moderates the relationship between generalized trust and preferences for redistribution. It has been well established in the literature that generalized trust is conducive to greater support for redistribution because it reduces expectations of cheating and free-riding among others.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Irina Levina (HSE IIMS) about the Decentralization of Firms in a Country with Weak Institutions

Irina Levina studied evidence from Russian firms to explore whether decentralization of firms can be successful under weak institutions. She introduced the concepts of real decentralization for the delegation of decision-making authority in firms to professional people hired though open competition, and of cautious decentralization – for the delegation to people hired through connections. Irina demonstrated that really decentralized Russian firms are, on average, significantly more likely to implement investment.