• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site
ФКН
Contacts

109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174

Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Department Manager Disa Malbakhova
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Book
RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Wahid Supriyadi M., Mosyakov D., Kanaev E. et al.

M.: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020.

Article
Social status and social learning

Zakharov A., Bondarenko O.

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 2021. Vol. 90(С).

Book chapter
An informational framework for studying social norms

J. Tremewan, Vostroknutov A.

In bk.: A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021. P. 19-42.

Working paper
Social Mobility And Preferences For Open Access Societies
In press

Veselov D. A.

Basic research program. WP BRP. National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2021. No. 250/EC/2021.

The Department of Theoretical Economics Research Seminar with Pavel Andreyanov, HSE

12+
*recommended age
Event ended

Dear colleagues,  

Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Assistant Professor Pavel Andreyanov, HSE

Date: October 19, 2021
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker:Pavel Andreyanov, Assistant Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics 

The link to Zoom: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/8734589888?pwd=UTlhZ2dJU2FaVHpWRElDK0hMamJudz09 
Meeting ID: 873 458 9888
Passcode: 010497

Title: "Secret Reserve Prices by Uninformed Sellers " (joint with El Hadi Caoui, U of Toronto)" 

Abstract:If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can allocate more efficiently by keeping her reserve price secret and revising it using submitted bids. We build a model of a first-price auction under unobserved auction heterogeneity---imperfectly observed by the seller---that captures this rationale and derive conditions for identification. An application to French timber auctions, where such revisions are widely used, shows that having perfect information about unobserved auction heterogeneity would increase surplus by 4.43%.  Combining a secret reserve price with learning from submitted bids reduces this surplus gap by up to 80%.