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109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27174, 27601, 28270
The Department of Theoretical Economics brings together highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, including micro and macroeconomics, monetary and financial theory, economic history and the history of economic thought. Our mission is to teach economic disciplines at HSE on the level of leading Western universities.
Karpov A. V., Markström K., Riis S. et al.
Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2025. Vol. 370. P. 57-70.
In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.
Andreyanov P., Krasikov I., Suzdaltsev A.
arxiv.org. Theoretical Economics. Cornell University, 2024
109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27174, 27601, 28270
The Department of Theoretical Economics Research Seminar with Pavel Andreyanov, HSE
Dear colleagues,
Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Assistant Professor Pavel Andreyanov, HSE
Date: October 19, 2021
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker:Pavel Andreyanov, Assistant Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics
The link to Zoom: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/8734589888?pwd=UTlhZ2dJU2FaVHpWRElDK0hMamJudz09
Meeting ID: 873 458 9888
Passcode: 010497
Title: "Secret Reserve Prices by Uninformed Sellers " (joint with El Hadi Caoui, U of Toronto)"
Abstract:If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can allocate more efficiently by keeping her reserve price secret and revising it using submitted bids. We build a model of a first-price auction under unobserved auction heterogeneity---imperfectly observed by the seller---that captures this rationale and derive conditions for identification. An application to French timber auctions, where such revisions are widely used, shows that having perfect information about unobserved auction heterogeneity would increase surplus by 4.43%. Combining a secret reserve price with learning from submitted bids reduces this surplus gap by up to 80%.