Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174
PhD, Penn State University
The Department of Theoretical Economics brings together highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, including micro and macroeconomics, monetary and financial theory, economic history and the history of economic thought. Our mission is to teach economic disciplines at HSE on the level of leading Western universities.
Nenovsky N., Faudot A.
Journal of the History of Economic Thought. 2023. P. 1-22.
Olga Demidova, Elena Kayasheva, Artem Demyanenko.
In bk.: Eurasian Business and Economics Perspectives: Proceedings of the 38th Eurasia Business and Economics Society Conference. Vol. 25. Springer Publishing Company, 2023. Ch. 13. P. 209-232.
Tabashnikova D., Sandomirskaia M.
Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2023. No. 263.
Dear colleagues, Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Associate Professor Mariya Teteryatnikova, HSEDate: October 3, 2023Time: 1:00 p.m.Working language: EnglishSpeaker: Mariya Teteryatnikova, Associate Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics
The link to MS Teams: Click here to join the meeting
ID: 338 598 102 924
Access code: LfS47F
Title: "Support Networks in Contests", joint with Anastasia Antsygina
Abstract: We study the incentives for formation of support networks among three heterogeneous agents in view of potential future conflict. With a positive probability, each agent engages in a contest game, which we model as an all-pay auction, against one of the other agents. Before the contest, the agents can create links with each other that will provide support in the contest and thus, determine agents’ competitive strengths. Forming a link is costly but results in direct and indirect benefits. The direct benefits realize when the player enters into a competition himself and receives support from the connections that were formed, while the indirect benefits occur when the player does not compete himself but derives utility from his connection's success in the competition. We show that a pairwise stable network always exists, and the introduction of indirect benefits has a non-trivial effect on the resulting network structure. In particular, a network with two or more links is pairwise stable if and only if indirect benefits are large enough. Finally, a pairwise stable network is generally inefficient and can display either underinvest or overinvest in the links.