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The Department of Theoretical Economics brings together highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, including micro and macroeconomics, monetary and financial theory, economic history and the history of economic thought. Our mission is to teach economic disciplines at HSE on the level of leading Western universities.
Ekonomicheskaya Politika. 2024.
In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.
Veselov D. A., Yarkin A.
IZA Discussion Papers. No. 17045. IZA, 2024
Dear colleagues,
Department of Theoretical Economicsand International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis invite you to attend the joint research seminar with Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow Dmitry Veselov, HSE
Date: November 28, 2023
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English
· The link to ZOOM: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/89197952991?pwd=SgpTPrKx0cGXsbSJWeFDqbvzH4Idzm.1
ID: 891 9795 2991
Access code: 177051
Title: «Lobbying for Industrialization: Theory and Evidence» joint with Alexander Yarkin
Abstract: This paper develops a model of lobbying over industrialization policies and tests its predictions against the data on public petitions to the British Parliament and the US Congress in the 18th-19th centuries. Our theory integrates endogenous lobbying over industrial policies into the standard two-sector model of structural change and predicts that the intensity of such lobbying displays a hump-shaped dynamics in the course of structural change away from agriculture. This prediction finds support in the
data on industrialization-related petitions in both Britain and the US. Moreover, the model predicts that places with historically more concentrated capital ownership lobby for industrialization more actively and overcome the status-quo earlier. The opposite holds for the concentration of land ownership. We find support for these predictions
linking the data on US petitions to manufacturing censuses of the 19th century. The calibrated model explores the joint dynamics of structural changes, inequality in incomes and lobbying in the British economy in the 18th-19th century.