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Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

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Department Manager Disa Malbakhova
Senior Administrator Zulikhan Ibragimbeili
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Administrator Marina Yudina
Article
A Theory of Monopolistic Competition with Horizontally Heterogeneous Consumers

Sergey Kokovin, Ozhegova A., Sharapudinov S. et al.

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2024. Vol. 16. No. 2. P. 354-384.

Book chapter
The Lack of Public Health Spending and Economic Growth in Russia: A Regional Aspect

Olga Demidova, Elena Kayasheva, Artem Demyanenko.

In bk.: Eurasian Business and Economics Perspectives: Proceedings of the 38th Eurasia Business and Economics Society Conference. Vol. 25. Springer Publishing Company, 2023. Ch. 13. P. 209-232.

Working paper
The optimal design of elimination tournaments with a superstar

Tabashnikova D., Sandomirskaia M.

Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2023. No. 263.

Joint DTE and ILMA research seminar with Dmitry Veselov, HSE

12+
*recommended age
Event ended

Dear colleagues,  

Department of Theoretical Economicsand International Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis invite you to attend the joint research seminar with Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow Dmitry Veselov,  HSE

Date: November 28, 2023
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English

·        The link to ZOOM:  https://us06web.zoom.us/j/89197952991?pwd=SgpTPrKx0cGXsbSJWeFDqbvzH4Idzm.1

ID: 891 9795 2991

Access code: 177051

Title: «Lobbying for Industrialization: Theory and Evidence» joint with Alexander Yarkin

Abstract: This paper develops a model of lobbying over industrialization policies and tests its predictions against the data on public petitions to the British Parliament and the US Congress in the 18th-19th centuries. Our theory integrates endogenous lobbying over industrial policies into the standard two-sector model of structural change and predicts that the intensity of such lobbying displays a hump-shaped dynamics in the course of structural change away from agriculture. This prediction finds support in the
data on industrialization-related petitions in both Britain and the US. Moreover, the model predicts that places with historically more concentrated capital ownership lobby for industrialization more actively and overcome the status-quo earlier. The opposite holds for the concentration of land ownership. We find support for these predictions
linking the data on US petitions to manufacturing censuses of the 19th century. The calibrated model explores the joint dynamics of structural changes, inequality in incomes and lobbying in the British economy in the 18th-19th century.