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Contacts

109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27174, 27601, 28270 

Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Senior Administrator Elizaveta Volodina
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Article
Coherent domains and improved lower bounds for the maximum size of Condorcet domains

Karpov A. V., Markström K., Riis S. et al.

Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2025. Vol. 370. P. 57-70.

Book chapter
Evaluation of the Degree of Manipulability of Positional Aggregation Procedures in a Dynamic Voting Model

Karabekyan D., Yakuba V. I.

In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.

Working paper
Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design

Andreyanov P., Krasikov I., Suzdaltsev A.

arxiv.org. Theoretical Economics. Cornell University, 2024

Contacts

109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27174, 27601, 28270 

Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Senior Administrator Elizaveta Volodina
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina

Department of Theoretical Economics research seminar with Daria Tabashnikova, HSE

12+
*recommended age
Event ended

Dear colleagues,  

Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Assistant and Ph.D student Daria Tabashnikova, HSE

Date: February 13, 2024
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English

·        The link to the seminar:https://telemost.yandex.ru/j/15438072141094

Title: " The optimal design of elimination tournaments with a superstar "  

Abstract: We study single- and double-elimination tournaments with heterogeneous players of two types: regular players and a superstar. Players choose efforts in each match with linear costs, winning with a probability calculated with the Tullock success function. We consider several designer maximization problems: total efforts, probability of winning the strongest player, and a weighted composed function. We show that a double-elimination tournament is less profitable in most cases, except when the tournament organizer is concerned about the probability that the superstar wins the tournament.