Department of Theoretical Economics

Regular version of the site

109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27174, 27601, 28270

Department Administration

Department Head – Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head – Svetlana Seregina

Manager – Zulikhan Ibragimbeili

Senior Administrator – Elizaveta Volodina

Senior Administrator – Natalia Baibouzenko

Administrator – Marina Yudina

About the Department

The Department of Theoretical Economics brings together highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, including micro and macroeconomics, monetary and financial theory, economic history and the history of economic thought. Our mission is to teach economic disciplines at HSE on the level of leading Western universities.

Publications

Book

Russian and Western Economic Thought: Mutual Influences and Transfer of Ideas

Springer, 2022.

Article

Fiscal multipliers, trend inflation, and endogenous price stickiness: Evidence from the U.S.

Gulenkov I.

Journal of Macroeconomics. 2025. Vol. 86.

Book chapter

Evaluation of the Degree of Manipulability of Positional Aggregation Procedures in a Dynamic Voting Model

Karabekyan D., Yakuba V. I.

In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.

Working paper

Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design

Andreyanov P., Krasikov I., Suzdaltsev A.

arxiv.org. Theoretical Economics. Cornell University, 2024

All publications

Delivered by:: Department of Theoretical Economics

Type:: Elective course

When:: 2 year, 2 module

Instructor

Andreyanov, Pasha

Full Syllabus Ask Question

Abstract

In this course, we will get acquainted with the main auction models: first price, second price, English, scoring, asymmetric and "common value"; we will learn how to find and compare profits. The main textbook is "Krishna, Auction Theory".

Learning Objectives

Find equilibria in I- and II- price auctions.
Find equilibria in affiliated values auctions
Find equilibria in scoring auctions
Compare revenue and bidder surplus across various formats
Learn to use theory to estimate an auction model
Discuss other auction models: asymmetric, with binding constraints.

Expected Learning Outcomes

be able to estimate and simulate simple auction models
be able to make a presentation
be able to set and solve simple auction models

Course Contents

Course overview and auctions taxonomy
Equilibria in I-price and II-price auctions
Introduction to mechanism design
Efficiency vs optimality, reserve prices
Scoring auctions, Double auctions
English auctions, common value
Collusion, Corruption
Confronting your model with the data

Assessment Elements

Attendance
This activity will consist of two ingredients. First, it is the attendance with the weight of 10%. Second, it is the participation in the class discussions, the weight is 5%. The total weight is 15%.
Theoretical HW
Practical HW
Final test
There will be a retake.

Interim Assessment

2025/2026 2nd module
0.15 * Attendance + 0.5 * Final test + 0.2 * Practical HW + 0.15 * Theoretical HW

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

An introduction to auction theory, Menezes, F. M., 2005
Auction theory, Krishna, V., 2002
Auction theory, Krishna, V., 2010
Auctions: theory and practice, Klemperer, P., 2004
Che, Y. K. (1991). Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions. Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.att.wimass.9123
Krishna, V. (2010). Auction Theory (Vol. 2nd ed). Burlington, MA: Academic Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=297062
Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993). Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions. Journal of Political Economy, (3), 518. https://doi.org/10.1086/261885

Recommended Additional Bibliography

Auctions, Hubbard, T. P., 2015

Authors

Andreianov Pavel Pavlovich
Tarasov Aleksandr Igorevich

Auctions: Theory and Practice