• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site
Contacts

109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174

Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Senior Administrator Zulikhan Ibragimbeili
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Book chapter
Evaluation of the Degree of Manipulability of Positional Aggregation Procedures in a Dynamic Voting Model

Karabekyan D., Yakuba V. I.

In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.

Working paper
Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design

Andreyanov P., Krasikov I., Suzdaltsev A.

arxiv.org. Theoretical Economics. Cornell University, 2024

Random Assignment Problems

2023/2024
Academic Year
ENG
Instruction in English
3
ECTS credits
Type:
Mago-Lego
When:
2 module

Instructor

Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang

Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The goal of the course is to prepare students to do cutting edge research, and solve industry and policy problems in market design. While discussing engineering aspects of designing several matching markets, we will get an overview of matching theory in several special markets such as random assignment problems and organ donation exchanges. Moreover, we study the effect of a pre-match investment and the effect of endogenous effort choice after the matching stage on the design of an efficient matching market. At the end, we will cover the large market models in order to study the trade of stability and strategyproofness.