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Contacts

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Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174

Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Senior Administrator Zulikhan Ibragimbeili
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Article
The Study of the Strategic Consequences of a Scoring Model Disclosure

Kryukov G. M., Sandomirskaia M.

Automation and Remote Control. 2024. Vol. 85. P. 696-710.

Book chapter
Evaluation of the Degree of Manipulability of Positional Aggregation Procedures in a Dynamic Voting Model

Karabekyan D., Yakuba V. I.

In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.

Working paper
Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design

Andreyanov P., Krasikov I., Suzdaltsev A.

arxiv.org. Theoretical Economics. Cornell University, 2024

Paper of Pavel Andreyanov in The Review of Economic Studies

Paper of Pavel Andreyanov in The Review of Economic Studies

Congratulations to Pavel Andreyanov, Assistant professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics, on the publication of his paper "Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange" in The Review of Economic Studies.

Below is a short summary of the paper:

In this paper, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel  discriminatory conditional double auction , without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.