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109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174
The Department of Theoretical Economics brings together highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, including micro and macroeconomics, monetary and financial theory, economic history and the history of economic thought. Our mission is to teach economic disciplines at HSE on the level of leading Western universities.
Kryukov G. M., Sandomirskaia M.
Automation and Remote Control. 2024. Vol. 85. P. 696-710.
In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.
Andreyanov P., Krasikov I., Suzdaltsev A.
arxiv.org. Theoretical Economics. Cornell University, 2024
Congratulations to Pavel Andreyanov, Assistant professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics, on the publication of his paper "Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange" in The Review of Economic Studies.
Below is a short summary of the paper:
In this paper, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction , without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.