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Regular version of the site
Contacts

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Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174

Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Department Manager Disa Malbakhova
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Book
RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Kanaev E., Galchenko E., Wahid Supriyadi M. et al.

M.: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020.

Article
Ambiguous Platforms and Correlated Preferences: Experimental Evidence
In press

Tolvanen J., Tremewan J., Wagner A.

American Political Science Review. 2021.

Book chapter
An informational framework for studying social norms

J. Tremewan, Vostroknutov A.

In bk.: A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021. P. 19-42.

Working paper
Social Mobility And Preferences For Open Access Societies
In press

Veselov D. A.

Basic research program. WP BRP. National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2021. No. 250/EC/2021.

Paper of Pavel Andreyanov in The Review of Economic Studies

Paper of Pavel Andreyanov in The Review of Economic Studies

Congratulations to Pavel Andreyanov, Assistant professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics, on the publication of his paper "Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange" in The Review of Economic Studies.

Below is a short summary of the paper:

In this paper, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel  discriminatory conditional double auction , without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.