The paper by Dmitry Dagaev and Andrey Zubanov was accepted for publication in the 'Social Choice and Welfare'

The paper 'Round-Robin Tournaments with Limited Resources' studies the equilibrium strategies of participants in a round-robin tournament who have a limited margin of effort.

In real-world sport round-robin tournaments, participating teams are sometimes forced to distribute their effort over multiple matches (for example, this may be due to the fact that athletes do not have time to recover in conditions of a complicated schedule). In this paper, authors consider the model of a round-robin tournament with 3 participants, and a contest success function in the form of a first-price auction. For tournaments with a relatively low first prize, authors found two types of equilibria: ‘effort-saving’ and ‘burning out’, both leading to unequal payoffs. In contrast, for tournaments with a large first prize a limited budget of effort, in general, does not allow for the first or the last move advantage to be exploited.