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Aleskerov F. T., Shvydun S., Meshcheryakova N.
CRC Press, 2022.
Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.
International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.
In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.
Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.
math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].
Abstract:
To what extent does economic self-interest shape policy preferences? This paper argues that individuals are more likely to translate personal hardship into higher support for redistributive social policies when political elites actively compete over redistributive issues. We first test this argument using individual panel data from Great Britain. We find evidence that the discursive context mediates the relationship between economic hardship and preferences. Using data from 24 European countries we then show that, where elites polarize over redistributive issues, low-income respondents are more likely – relative to high-income individuals – to support redistribution.