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Aleskerov F. T., Shvydun S., Meshcheryakova N.
CRC Press, 2022.
Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.
International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.
In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.
Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.
math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].
This paper concerns the distortions in electoral outcomes when mass media strategically distorts the interactions between candidates and voters. We develop an election model where a voter cannot directly observe the policies proposed by two oﬃce-motivated candidates. The voter learns this information through media reports before voting takes place, while the media outlet strategically conceals some part of this information. Because incorrect decision-making by the voter is unavoidable (direct distortion), the candidates have an incentive to inuence the media outlet's behavior through policy settings that are indirectly appealing to the voter (indirect distortion). As a result, policy convergence never occurs if and only if the outlet is suﬃciently biased. We then measure the degree of distortion in the equilibrium outcomes by the voter's ex ante expected utility, and characterize the least and most distorted scenarios. This characterization shows that the distortion becomes severer as the outlet becomes more biased. By decomposing total distortion into its components, we also illustrate the tension arising between the direct and the indirect distortion.