HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Andrea Matozzi (European University Institute) about the Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

Andrea Matozzi introduced a model of turnout where social norms, strategically chosen by competing political parties, determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged.

Topic: Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

joint work with David K. Levine

Abstract: We introduce a model of turnout where social norms, strategically chosen by competing political parties, determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the “ethical” voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

the seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy was held on October 02.

Moderators: Alexei Zakharov (HSE), Konstantin Sonin (HSE, The University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy)