119049, Moscow, 26 Shabolovka Ulitsa, Room 5414;
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90*26068, 26070;
Fuad T. Aleskerov
Tatiana Georgievna Pitra
Alexander S. Belenky.
Myachin A. L.
Automation and Remote Control. 2019. Vol. 80. No. 1. P. 112-123.
Meshcheryakova N. G.
In bk.: Studies in Computational Intelligence. Vol. 813: Complex Networks and Their Applications VII. Prt. 2. Springer, 2019. Ch. 7. P. 80-90.
Zlotnik A., Lomonosov T.
arxiv.org. math. Cornell University, 2018
Topic: Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment
joint work with David K. Levine
Abstract: We introduce a model of turnout where social norms, strategically chosen by competing political parties, determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the “ethical” voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.
the seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy was held on October 02.
Moderators: Alexei Zakharov (HSE), Konstantin Sonin (HSE, The University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy)