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109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174
The Department of Theoretical Economics brings together highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, including micro and macroeconomics, monetary and financial theory, economic history and the history of economic thought. Our mission is to teach economic disciplines at HSE on the level of leading Western universities.
Dranev Y., Miriakov M., Ochirova E. et al.
Journal of Corporate Finance Research. 2024. Vol. 18. No. 1. P. 5-19.
Olga Demidova, Elena Kayasheva, Artem Demyanenko.
In bk.: Eurasian Business and Economics Perspectives: Proceedings of the 38th Eurasia Business and Economics Society Conference. Vol. 25. Springer Publishing Company, 2023. Ch. 13. P. 209-232.
Tabashnikova D., Sandomirskaia M.
Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2023. No. 263.
The Department of Theoretical Economics Research Seminar with Alexander Tarasov, HSE
Dear colleagues,
Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Associate Professor Alexander Tarasov, HSE
Date: October 26, 2021
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker:Alexander Tarasov, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Theoretical Economics
The link to Zoom: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84476855115?pwd=RVBDL3pTYSt6QXdTU0JLR3ZnOGttUT09
Meeting ID: 844 7685 5115
Passcode: 021827
Title: "Optimal Income Taxation under Monopolistic Competition" (joint with Robertas Zubrickas, University of Bath)
Abstract:This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (1971) model of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that price and variety distortions resulting from the market structure imply that income tax policy needs to be complemented with commodity or firm taxation to achieve the constrained social optimum. We calibrate the model and find that, when choosing optimal tax policy, the failure to account for the market structure results in a welfare loss of 1:77 percent. Motivated by practical cases, we study a policy regime that is solely based on income taxation. Under this policy regime, departures from the social optimum can be compensated by lower and less regressive income taxes than those obtained under the regime with all forms of taxation. We also examine the role of consumer preferences for policy outcomes and show that it is substantially amplified by an endogenous market structure.