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Contacts

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Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174

Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Department Manager Disa Malbakhova
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Book
RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Wahid Supriyadi M., Mosyakov D., Kanaev E. et al.

M.: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020.

Article
Nowcasting Russian GDP using forecast combination approach

Zhemkov M.

International Economics. 2021. Vol. 168. P. 10-24.

Book chapter
An informational framework for studying social norms

J. Tremewan, Vostroknutov A.

In bk.: A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021. P. 19-42.

Working paper
Social Mobility And Preferences For Open Access Societies
In press

Veselov D. A.

Basic research program. WP BRP. National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2021. No. 250/EC/2021.

The Department of Theoretical Economics Research Seminar with Alexander Tarasov, HSE

12+
*recommended age
Event ended

Dear colleagues,  

Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Associate Professor Alexander TarasovHSE

Date: October 26, 2021
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker:Alexander Tarasov, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Theoretical Economics 

 

The link to Zoom: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84476855115?pwd=RVBDL3pTYSt6QXdTU0JLR3ZnOGttUT09

Meeting ID: 844 7685 5115
Passcode: 021827

Title: "Optimal Income Taxation under Monopolistic Competition" (joint with Robertas Zubrickas, University of Bath)

Abstract:This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (1971) model of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that price and variety distortions resulting from the market structure imply that income tax policy needs to be complemented with commodity or firm taxation to achieve the constrained social optimum. We calibrate the model and find that, when choosing optimal tax policy, the failure to account for the market structure results in a welfare loss of 1:77 percent. Motivated by practical cases, we study a policy regime that is solely based on income taxation. Under this policy regime, departures from the social optimum can be compensated by lower and less regressive income taxes than those obtained under the regime with all forms of taxation. We also examine the role of consumer preferences for policy outcomes and show that it is substantially amplified by an endogenous market structure.