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Contacts

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Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27174, 27601, 28270 

Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Senior Administrator Elizaveta Volodina
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Book chapter
Resource-based International Currency: A History of a Failed Consensual Idea

Nenovsky N.

In bk.: International Economic and Monetary Architecture at the Crossroads Bretton Woods at 80. Routledge, 2025.

Working paper
Support Link Formation in Contests: Theory and an Experiment

Antsygina A., Teteryatnikova M., Tremewan J. C. et al.

SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2025

Paper of Alexander Tarasov in Economic Theory

Congratulations to Alexander Tarasov, Head and Associate Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics, on the publication of his paper "Optimal income taxation under monopolistic competition " in Economic Theory.

Paper of Alexander Tarasov in Economic Theory

Abstract: This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (Rev Econ Stud 38:175–208, 1971) model of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that quantity and variety distortions resulting from the market structure require adjustments to income tax policy, which also needs to be complemented with commodity or firm taxation to achieve the constrained social optimum. We calibrate the model and find that in policy design the failure to account for the market structure results in a welfare loss of 1.77%. Motivated by practical cases, we study a policy regime that is solely based on income taxation. We show that departures from the social optimum can be compensated by lower and less regressive income taxes and a smaller government compared to the regime with income and commodity taxes. We also examine the role of consumer preferences for policy outcomes and show that it is substantially amplified by an endogenous market structure.

The full paper is available here: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-022-01463-z