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Regular version of the site
Contacts

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Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174

Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Department Manager Disa Malbakhova
Senior Administrator Zulikhan Ibragimbeili
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Article
The Impact of ESG Ratings on Exchange-Traded Fund Flows

Dranev Y., Miriakov M., Ochirova E. et al.

Journal of Corporate Finance Research. 2024. Vol. 18. No. 1. P. 5-19.

Book chapter
The Lack of Public Health Spending and Economic Growth in Russia: A Regional Aspect

Olga Demidova, Elena Kayasheva, Artem Demyanenko.

In bk.: Eurasian Business and Economics Perspectives: Proceedings of the 38th Eurasia Business and Economics Society Conference. Vol. 25. Springer Publishing Company, 2023. Ch. 13. P. 209-232.

Working paper
The optimal design of elimination tournaments with a superstar

Tabashnikova D., Sandomirskaia M.

Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2023. No. 263.

Paper of Alexander Tarasov in Economic Theory

Congratulations to Alexander Tarasov, Head and Associate Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics, on the publication of his paper "Optimal income taxation under monopolistic competition " in Economic Theory.

Paper of Alexander Tarasov in Economic Theory

Abstract: This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (Rev Econ Stud 38:175–208, 1971) model of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that quantity and variety distortions resulting from the market structure require adjustments to income tax policy, which also needs to be complemented with commodity or firm taxation to achieve the constrained social optimum. We calibrate the model and find that in policy design the failure to account for the market structure results in a welfare loss of 1.77%. Motivated by practical cases, we study a policy regime that is solely based on income taxation. We show that departures from the social optimum can be compensated by lower and less regressive income taxes and a smaller government compared to the regime with income and commodity taxes. We also examine the role of consumer preferences for policy outcomes and show that it is substantially amplified by an endogenous market structure.

The full paper is available here: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-022-01463-z