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Руководство
Руководитель департамента Тарасов Александр Игоревич

PhD, Университет Штата Пенсильвания

Заместитель руководителя департамента Серегина Светлана Федоровна
Глава в книге
Resource-based International Currency: A History of a Failed Consensual Idea

Nenovsky N.

In bk.: International Economic and Monetary Architecture at the Crossroads Bretton Woods at 80. Routledge, 2025.

Препринт
Дискурс о рынке в советской политической экономии

Ананьин О. И., Мельник Д. В.

Научные доклады Института экономики РАН. Институт экономики РАН, 2025

Публикация Александра Тарасова в Economic Theory

Поздравляем Александра Тарасова, руководителя и доцента департамента теоретической экономики, с публикацией статьи "Optimal income taxation under monopolistic competition" в журнале Economic Theory.

Публикация Александра Тарасова в Economic Theory

Аннотация статьи:
This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (Rev Econ Stud 38:175–208, 1971) mo
del of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that quantity and variety distortions resulting from the market structure require adjustments to income tax policy, which also needs to be complemented with commodity or firm taxation to achieve the constrained social optimum. We calibrate the model and find that in policy design the failure to account for the market structure results in a welfare loss of 1.77%. Motivated by practical cases, we study a policy regime that is solely based on income taxation. We show that departures from the social optimum can be compensated by lower and less regressive income taxes and a smaller government compared to the regime with income and commodity taxes. We also examine the role of consumer preferences for policy outcomes and show that it is substantially amplified by an endogenous market structure.

Публикация доступна по ссылке: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-022-01463-z