Applied Market Design

2022/2023

Учебный год

ENG

Обучение ведется на английском языке

3

Кредиты

Кто читает:

Департамент теоретической экономики

Статус:

Курс по выбору

Когда читается:

3-й курс, 3 модуль

Преподаватель

Баранов Олег Валерьевич

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The class offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows to analyze a broad set of situations (including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation) and forces students to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems (i.e., "economist as engineer" approach). The class focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the class accessible to undergraduate students, special effort is made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuition, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples.

Learning Objectives

• Understand and solve stylized market design models
• Develop critical thinking about market design problems
• Understand the basic principles of strategic interactions among market participants
• Understand basic real world markets and describe them with formal models
• Evaluate different market designs and assess their effectivness

Expected Learning Outcomes

• Understand and solve stylized market design models
• Develop critical thinking about market design problems
• Understand the basic principles of strategic interactions among market participants
• Understand basic real world markets and describe them with formal models
• Evaluate different market designs and assess their effectivness

Course Contents

• Introduction to Matching Markets
• Stable Matching and Orderly Markets
• House Allocation and Kidney Exchange
• School Choice
• Military Match
• Introduction to Auction Theory
• Designing Good Auctions
• Common Value Auctions
• Multi-Unit Auctions
• Sponsored Search Auctions
• Combinatorial Auctions
• Large-Scale Auctions for Radio Spectrum
• Master Section for Applied Market Design

Assessment Elements

• Problem Sets
  Regular Problem Sets
• Weekly Activities
  Weekly Activities
• Online Quizes
  Online Tests vis Smart LMS
• Midterm Exam
• Final Exam

Interim Assessment

• 2022/2023 3rd module
  0.2 * Online Quizes + 0.2 * Midterm Exam + 0.3 * Final Exam + 0.15 * Problem Sets + 0.15 * Weekly Activities

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• Haeringer, G. (2018). Market Design: Auctions and Matching. The MIT Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.mtp.titles.0262037548
• Market design : auctions and matching, Haeringer, G., 2017

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• The handbook of market design, , 2015
• Who gets what―and why: the new economics of matchmaking and market design, Roth, A.E., 2016