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Contacts

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Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174

Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Department Manager Disa Malbakhova
Senior Administrator Zulikhan Ibragimbeili
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Book chapter
Evaluation of the Degree of Manipulability of Positional Aggregation Procedures in a Dynamic Voting Model

Karabekyan D., Yakuba V. I.

In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.

Working paper
Lobbying for Industrialization: Theory and Evidence

Veselov D. A., Yarkin A.

IZA Discussion Papers. No. 17045. IZA, 2024

Department of Theoretical Economics Research Seminar with Kivanc Akoz, HSE

12+
*recommended age

Dear colleagues,  

Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Assistant Professor Kemal Kivanc Akoz,  HSE

Date: October 22, 2024
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker: Kemal Kivanc Akoz, Assistant Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics

·  

The link to the seminar: https://telemost.yandex.ru/j/5183556177 

Title: "Search in a Non-exclusive Online Matching Platform" joint with Emre Dogan and Levent Celik

 

Abstract: Every year more people around the world use dating platforms. Yet little is understood about the marriage markets when there are profit maximizing platforms operating in the market. We analyze a standard search and matching model of a marriage market but with a non-exclusive matching platform. Subscribers to the platform enjoy an additional flow of contacts through the platform in exchange for a flow-price for subscription and can continue to search outside of the platform. We first describe the set of search equilibria when there is a platform. Then, we prove existence of an equilibrium with non-zero subscription at a positive price. Finally, for uniform distribution of types, we numerically calculate the equilibrium, matching, type-distribution of singles and a demand function that the platform faces. We find that market demand may locally behave like "Giffen goods" as there are ranges of prices where the market demand increases with price

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