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Контакты

109028, Москва,
Покровский бульвар 11, Администрация департамента: офисы S1029, S1030; тел: +7(495) 772-95-90 *27172, 27173, 27174                                                                                 
 

Руководство
Руководитель департамента Тарасов Александр Игоревич

PhD, Пенсильванский Университет

Заместитель руководителя Серегина Светлана Федоровна
Глава в книге
The Complexity of Election Problems with Group-Separable Preferences

Karpov A. V., Obraztsova S., Faliszewski P.

In bk.: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-20). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2020. P. 203-209.

Препринт
Commodity Cycles and Financial Instability in Emerging Economies

Andreev M., Peiris U., Shirobokov A. et al.

WORKING PAPER SERIES. 57. Bank of Russia, 2020. No. 57.

Научный семинар Департамента теоретической экономики с участием ассистента и аспиранта Владимира Щукина, НИУ ВШЭ

12+
Мероприятие завершено

Приглашаем на научный семинар Департамента теоретической экономики, который состоится: 26 мая 2020 года в 13:40 

Ссылка для подключения к семинару: https://zoom.us/j/96772969416

Рабочий язык семинара: английский

В рамках семинара выступит: Щукин Владимир, аспирант Департамента теоретической экономики

 Тема выступления: "Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage"

Аннотация:  Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote buying are clientelist practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, prior to election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment which can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show, that when the politician can use both clientelist instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost per vote secured declines because these tools can complement more than substitute each other. Furthermore, if rents to office is sufficiently high, the equilibrium level of state investment also declines.