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Regular version of the site
An Approach to Estimating the Economic Expediency of Developing a New Cargo Transport Hub by a Regional Public Administration

Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.

International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.

Book chapter
A note on subspaces of fixed grades in Clifford algebras

Shirokov D.

In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.

Working paper
On compact 4th order finite-difference schemes for the wave equation

Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.

math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].

Tag "Reporting an event" – News

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Olga Valisyeva (Economics Research Institute, Far East RAS) about the effect of elite fragmentation in autocracies on the influence of resource abundance on the economic growth

Olga Valisyeva used the political variation across sub-national regions of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin to understand how differences in the extent of elite fragmentation in autocracies affects the influence of resource abundance on the economic growth in the short run. She found that polities with fragmented elites underperform those with consolidated elites and link this effect to higher intensity of rent-seeking and higher costs of fights over rents due to the shorter time horizon of the elites.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Heike Hennig-Schmid (Laboratory for Experimental Economics University of Bonn) about the dishonesty in healthcare practice

Heike Hennig-Schmid analyzed the effect of a random audit including fines on individuals' honesty by means of a novel controlled behavioral experiment framed in a neonatal care context. He found evidence that individual characteristics (gender, medical background, integrity) are related to dishonest behavior. 

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Andrea Matozzi (European University Institute) about the Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

Andrea Matozzi introduced a model of turnout where social norms, strategically chosen by competing political parties, determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Anand E. Sokhey (University of Colorado at Boulder) about the impact of physical attractiveness of on productivity

Anand E. Sokhey presented multifaceted approach to the relationship between religion and gun control, drawing upon the integration of Christian nationalist views, partisanship, and clergy messaging.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Jan Fidrmuc (Department of Economics and Finance and CEDI, Brunel University) about the impact of physical attractiveness of on productivity

Jan Fidrmuc studied the impact of physical attractiveness of on productivity. He utilize a context where there is no or limited face-to-face interaction, academic publishing, so that scope for beauty-based discrimination should be limited. Using data on around 2,000 authors of journal publications in economics, he found a significantly positive effect of authors’ attractiveness on both journal quality and citations. 

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Anastasia Burkovskaya (University of Sydney) about Electoral Model and Ballot Stuffing

Anastasia Burkovskaya introduced a model of electoral choice that allows for derivation of joint distribution of turnout and voter share from unobservable joint distribution of costs of voting and preferences over candidates. Under a set of mild assumptions, she showed non-parametric identification of joint distribution of costs of voting and preferences over candidates from observable data on single elections/referendum.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Konstantin Sonin (University of Chicago and Higher School of Economics, Moscow) about Media Freedom

Konstantin Sonin used a global game approach to analyze a situation, in which the incumbent leader trades off the possibility of protest against him and the possibility of protests aimed to restore his power if he is dismissed in a coup. Thus, media freedom serves as an ex ante protection for such a dictator.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (University of Chicago) about cyberwarfare models

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita studied deterrence in a world where attacks cannot be perfectly attributed to attackers. In his model, each of n attackers may attack the defender. The defender observes an imperfect signal that probabilistically attributes the attack. The defender may retaliate against one or more attackers, and wants to retaliate against the guilty attacker only. He uncover an endogenous strategic complementarity among the attackers: if one attacker becomes more aggressive, that attacker becomes more “suspect” and the other attackers become less suspect, which leads the other attackers to become more aggressive as well. 

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Chris Berry (University of Chicago) about Leader Effects

Chris Berry explained the quantitative test of leader effects (RIFLE), that allows researchers to test a null hypothesis of no leader effect and also estimate the proportion of variation in an outcome variable attributable to leaders vs. other factors. To demonstrate the substantive value of RIFLE, he implemented it for world leaders, U.S. governors, and U.S. mayors and for several outcomes. This results improve understanding of where, when, and why leaders matter.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Chris Miller (Fletcher School, Tufts University) about the Politics of Inflation and the Distribution of Income in Early 1990s Russia

Chris Miller analyzed inflation and the distribution of income in early 1990s Russia and explained the failure to stabilize prices, making use of newly collected sources from the State Archive of the Russian Federation as well as Yegor Gaidar’s personal archive