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Regular version of the site
Contacts

109028, Moscow
11 Pokrovsky Boulevard,
Room Т-614
Phone: (495) 628-83-68

email: fes@hse.ru 

Administration
Academic Supervisor Konstantin Sonin
First Deputy Dean Sergey Merzlyakov
Deputy Dean for Academic Work Elena Pokatovich
Deputy Dean for Research Dmitry A. Veselov
Deputy Dean for International Affairs Ludmila S. Zasimova
Deputy Dean for Undergraduate Studies Elena Burmistrova
Article
Event study methodology in M&A research

Vinogradova V.

Digest Finance. 2021. Vol. 26. No. 1. P. 4-25.

Book chapter
A note on subspaces of fixed grades in Clifford algebras

Shirokov D.

In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.

Working paper
Extreme value analysis for mixture models with heavy-tailed impurity

Panov V., Морозова Е. А.

math. arxive. Cornell University, 2021. No. 2103.07689.

International Webinar (Joint FES and ICEF)

Event ended
Speaker: Research Fellow Alex Suzdaltsev (Stanford GSB/HSE) will present his paper An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction
Date: 04.03.2021
Time: 13:00-14:20
Place: The seminar will be held in zoom:  https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81680732262
Language: English
Abstract: An indivisible object may be sold to one of n agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the means (which may be different) and an upper bound for valuations. Valuations may be correlated.
Using a constructive approach based on duality, we prove that a mechanism that maximizes the worst-case expected revenue among all deterministic dominant-strategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rational mechanisms is such that the object should be awarded to the agent with the highest linear score provided it is nonnegative. Linear scores are bidder-specific linear functions of bids. The set of optimal mechanisms includes other mechanisms but all those have to be close to the optimal linear score auction in a certain sense. When means are high, all optimal mechanisms share the linearity property. Second-price auction without a reserve is an optimal mechanism when the number of symmetric bidders is sufficiently high.