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Regular version of the site

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru

School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Anastasia Lomakina
Senior Administrator Anastasia Lomakina
Book chapter
Influence of Countries in the Global Arms Transfers Network: 1950–2018

Shvydun S.

In bk.: Studies in Computational Intelligence. Vol. 882: Complex Networks and Their Applications VIII. Part 2. Springer, 2020. P. 736-748.

Working paper
Noncommutative algebras, context-free grammars and algebraic Hilbert series

Piontkovski D., La Scala R., Tiwari S.

arxiv.org. math. Cornell University, 2019


HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Aleksey Oshchepkov (HSE) about Network Corruption

Aleksey Oshchepkov explored the network (or parochial) corruption which is conditional on the social connections between bureaucrats and private agents. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) which covers all post-socialist countries? Aleksey found that network corruption is more persistent over time, less related to contemporary national socio-economic and institutional characteristics and has stronger historical roots than market corruption

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Dmitry Veselov (HSE) about migration of Russian settlers and the legacy of interregional development in Kazakhstan

Dmitry Veselov explored the effect of migration of Russian settlers on the intra-regional development in Kazakhstan using the 1897 census dataset of the Russian Empire and modern economic data to provide links between the density of the Russian population in Kazakhstan and the current level of economic development.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Koen Schoors (Ghent University) about the Generalized Trust and Preferences for Redistribution and Institutions

Koen Schoors studied how institutional quality moderates the relationship between generalized trust and preferences for redistribution. It has been well established in the literature that generalized trust is conducive to greater support for redistribution because it reduces expectations of cheating and free-riding among others.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Irina Levina (HSE IIMS) about the Decentralization of Firms in a Country with Weak Institutions

Irina Levina studied evidence from Russian firms to explore whether decentralization of firms can be successful under weak institutions. She introduced the concepts of real decentralization for the delegation of decision-making authority in firms to professional people hired though open competition, and of cautious decentralization – for the delegation to people hired through connections. Irina demonstrated that really decentralized Russian firms are, on average, significantly more likely to implement investment.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Gerhard Toews (NES) about the consequences of sending enemies of the people to the system of forced labor camps in the Soviet Union

Gerhard Toews analyzed the consequences of sending "enemies of the people" to the Gulag. He showed that areas around camps with a larger share of enemies among prisoners are more prosperous today, as captured by night lights per capita, firm productivity, wages, and education.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Natalia Naumenko (Brown University) about the impact of the 1933 Soviet famine on population and urbanization patterns

Natalia Naumenko studied the impact of the 1933 Soviet famine on population and urbanization patterns and argued that the shortage of labor during the crucial years of rapid industrialization hindered the development of cities in areas struck by the famine. 

Fuad Aleskerov Elected to Academia Europaea

Fuad Aleskerov, Tenured HSE Professor, Head of the Faculty of Economic Sciences’ Department of Mathematics
Tenured HSE Professor Fuad Aleskerov, who is the head of the Faculty of Economic Sciences’ Department of Mathematics, has become a member of the Informatics section of the Academia Europaea.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Inna Zaitseva (HSE) about the “Moneyball” phenomenon and players' incentives in football

Inna Zaitseva studied players' incentives to exert different levels of effort in different games. The hypothesis of her research suggests that players can express their loyalty to the values of their club by increasing the level of effort in matches, which are considered as principal for the club. One of the explicit criteria for principal matches in football is a derby status of a game. This research demonstrates, that players in Bundesliga in season 2017-2018 exerted a greater level of effort in home derby games, which supports the idea of players’ loyalty to club’s values.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Gari Walkowitz (Technical University of Munich, Center Digitization.Bavaria) about the Economic Consequences of Moral Hypocrisy

Gari Walkowitz discussed the effectiveness of (apparently) fair procedures - which are under the full control of the agent in situations which entail a conflict of interest and when social pressures to conform are high - and analyzed a specific form of inter-personal deception: moral hypocrisy, i.e., saying one thing (trying to appear moral to others) but doing another (act immorally).

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Eren Arbatli (HSE) about the Collective Memory and Persistent Party Identification

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Eren Arbatli (HSE) about the Collective Memory and Persistent Party Identification
Can party loyalty be motivated by social and cultural identities transmitted across generations and collective memory? Eren Arbatli says "yes", analyzing the history of Sasun, a mountainous region of the Ottoman Empire located in Eastern Turkey.