• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site
Contacts

109028, Moscow
11 Pokrovsky Boulevard,
Room Т-614
Phone: (495) 628-83-68

email: fes@hse.ru 

Administration
First Deputy Dean Sergey Merzlyakov
Deputy Dean for Academic Work Elena Pokatovich
Deputy Dean for Research Dmitry A. Veselov
Deputy Dean for International Affairs Liudmila S. Zasimova
Deputy Dean for Undergraduate Studies Elena Burmistrova
Book
Systemic Financial Risk
In press

Springer Publishing Company, 2024.

Article
Patenting for profitability: green energy innovations and firm performance in BRICS countries

Makeeva E. Y., Popov K., Teplova O.

Frontiers in Environmental Science. 2024. Vol. 12. P. 1-14.

Book chapter
The Living Standards in the USSR During the Interwar Period
In press

Voskoboynikov I.

In bk.: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance. Oxford University Press, 2024.

Working paper
Strategizing with AI: Insights from a Beauty Contest Experiment

Dagaev D., Paklina S., Parshakov P.

Social Science Research Network. Social Science Research Network. SSRN, 2024

ES International Research Seminar Series with Igor Letina, University of Bern

12+
*recommended age
Event ended

Our next speaker in the FES International Seminar Series is Igor Letina who is an Assistant Professor at University of Bern.

His main research interest focuses on applied microeconomic theory, in particular the questions related to economics of innovation and contest design.

Speaker: Igor Letina (University of Bern).

Title:Killer acquisitions and the incentive to innovate (joint with Armin Schmutzler and Regina Seibel, both University of Zurich)

Abstract: Competition policy observers are becoming increasingly concerned about adverse effects of mergers on potential competition. In particular, a lot of attention has been paid to so-called killer acquisitions, where an incumbent firm buys up an innovative start-up and then does not commercialize its research ideas. This paper deals with the effects of killer acquisitions on innovation in a model where an incumbent and an entrant can both invest in multiple research projects. We find that prohibiting killer acquisitions reduces the diversity of research approaches pursued by the firms and thereby the probability of developing breakthrough innovations. These findings have to be weighed against the well-known anti-competitive effect resulting from the elimination of the would-be entrant.

Date: December 16, 2019                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
Time: 13:40-15:00                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Venue:
 Pokrovka campus, room  T510 (109028, Moscow,  Pokrovsky Boulevard 11)                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Working language:
English

For external participants:  to order the pass, please contact Disa Malbakhova dmalbakhova@hse.ru