,
11 Pokrovsky Boulevard,
Room Т-614
Phone: (495) 628-83-68
email: fes@hse.ru
Founded in 1992, the HSE Faculty of Economics is the university’s oldest faculty. In the years since it was founded, it has gained a reputation as Russia’s leader in terms of higher economic education.
A fundamental education in modern economic theory and mathematics is combined with the study of applied disciplines, such as taxation, budget policies and processes, financial management and other related fields.
Besstremyannaya G., Dasher R., Golovan S.
HSE Economic Journal. 2025. Vol. 29. No. 1. P. 72-102.
In bk.: Advances in Computer Graphics: 41st Computer Graphics International Conference, CGI 2024, Geneva, Switzerland, July 1–5, 2024, Proceedings, Part III. Vol. 15340. Springer, 2025. P. 336-348.
Lyakhovich S., Piontkovski D.
arxiv.org. Physics. Cornell University, 2025
,
11 Pokrovsky Boulevard,
Room Т-614
Phone: (495) 628-83-68
email: fes@hse.ru
FES and ICEF joint seminar
"Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?"
Abstract: We propose a model of asset management in which benchmarking arises endogenously, and analyze the unintended welfare consequences of benchmarking. Fund managers’ portfolios are unobservable and they incur private costs in running them. Conditioning managers’ compensation on a benchmark portfolio’s performance, partially protects them from risk, and thus gives them incentives to generate more alpha. In general equilibrium, these compensation contracts create an externality through their effect on asset prices. Benchmarking inflates asset prices and gives rise to crowded trades, thereby reducing the effectiveness of incentive contracts for others. Contracts chosen by fund investors diverge from socially optimal ones. A social planner, recognizing the crowding, opts for less benchmarking and less incentive provision. We also show that asset-management costs are lower with socially optimal contracts, and the planner’s benchmark-portfolio weights differ from the privately optimal ones.