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Contacts

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Phone: (495) 628-83-68

email: fes@hse.ru 

Administration
First Deputy Dean Sergey Merzlyakov
Deputy Dean for Academic Work Elena Pokatovich
Deputy Dean for Research Dmitry A. Veselov
Deputy Dean for International Affairs Liudmila S. Zasimova
Deputy Dean for Undergraduate Studies Elena Burmistrova
Book
Systemic Financial Risk
In press

Springer Publishing Company, 2024.

Book chapter
The Living Standards in the USSR During the Interwar Period
In press

Voskoboynikov I.

In bk.: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance. Oxford University Press, 2024.

Working paper
Strategizing with AI: Insights from a Beauty Contest Experiment

Dagaev D., Paklina S., Parshakov P.

Social Science Research Network. Social Science Research Network. SSRN, 2024

Tag "game theory" – News

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Gari Walkowitz (Technical University of Munich, Center Digitization.Bavaria) about the Economic Consequences of Moral Hypocrisy

Gari Walkowitz discussed the effectiveness of (apparently) fair procedures - which are under the full control of the agent in situations which entail a conflict of interest and when social pressures to conform are high - and analyzed a specific form of inter-personal deception: moral hypocrisy, i.e., saying one thing (trying to appear moral to others) but doing another (act immorally).

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (University of Chicago) about cyberwarfare models

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita studied deterrence in a world where attacks cannot be perfectly attributed to attackers. In his model, each of n attackers may attack the defender. The defender observes an imperfect signal that probabilistically attributes the attack. The defender may retaliate against one or more attackers, and wants to retaliate against the guilty attacker only. He uncover an endogenous strategic complementarity among the attackers: if one attacker becomes more aggressive, that attacker becomes more “suspect” and the other attackers become less suspect, which leads the other attackers to become more aggressive as well.