Kemal Kivanc Akoz (HSE) examined usage of preemptive and counter offers in multiagent games with full and partial information.
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Regular version of the site
,
11 Pokrovsky Boulevard,
Room Т-614
Phone: (495) 628-83-68
email: fes@hse.ru
Administration
Dean
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Sergey E. Pekarski
First Deputy Dean
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Sergey Merzlyakov
Deputy Dean for Academic Work
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Elena Pokatovich
Deputy Dean for Research
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Dmitry A. Veselov
Deputy Dean for International Affairs
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Liudmila S. Zasimova
Deputy Dean for Undergraduate Studies
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Elena Burmistrova
Events
Apr 26 – Apr 27
Founded in 1992, the HSE Faculty of Economics is the university’s oldest faculty. In the years since it was founded, it has gained a reputation as Russia’s leader in terms of higher economic education.
A fundamental education in modern economic theory and mathematics is combined with the study of applied disciplines, such as taxation, budget policies and processes, financial management and other related fields.
Article
Makeeva E. Y., Popov K., Teplova O.
Frontiers in Environmental Science. 2024. Vol. 12. P. 1-14.
Book chapter
In press
In bk.: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance. Oxford University Press, 2024.
Working paper
Dagaev D., Paklina S., Parshakov P.
Social Science Research Network. Social Science Research Network. SSRN, 2024
Newsletter
Tag "Department of Mathematics" – News
Eugenia Chernina (HSE) explored how far individuals’ perceptions deviate from the true level of inequality and what factors shape the divergence.
Gari Walkowitz discussed the effectiveness of (apparently) fair procedures - which are under the full control of the agent in situations which entail a conflict of interest and when social pressures to conform are high - and analyzed a specific form of inter-personal deception: moral hypocrisy, i.e., saying one thing (trying to appear moral to others) but doing another (act immorally).
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita studied deterrence in a world where attacks cannot be perfectly attributed to attackers. In his model, each of n attackers may attack the defender. The defender observes an imperfect signal that probabilistically attributes the attack. The defender may retaliate against one or more attackers, and wants to retaliate against the guilty attacker only. He uncover an endogenous strategic complementarity among the attackers: if one attacker becomes more aggressive, that attacker becomes more “suspect” and the other attackers become less suspect, which leads the other attackers to become more aggressive as well.
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