Tag "research projects" – News

Yogender Singh and Samarth Singh are second-year undergraduate students at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay. Without official partnership between the two universities, both Yogender and Samarth took the initiative to apply to HSE themselves. This summer, they are completing two-month research internships at the HSE International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis, under the wings of Professor Fuad Aleskerov.

The next speaker at the FES International Research Seminar Series was Associate Professor Quoc-Anh Do, Sciences Po (Institute of Political Studies).

The next speaker at the FES International Research Seminar Series was Professor Elena Carletti, Bocconi University.

Kemal Kivanc Akoz (HSE) examined usage of preemptive and counter offers in multiagent games with full and partial information.

Eugenia Chernina (HSE) explored how far individuals’ perceptions deviate from the true level of inequality and what factors shape the divergence.

Gari Walkowitz discussed the effectiveness of (apparently) fair procedures - which are under the full control of the agent in situations which entail a conflict of interest and when social pressures to conform are high - and analyzed a specific form of inter-personal deception: moral hypocrisy, i.e., saying one thing (trying to appear moral to others) but doing another (act immorally).

Can party loyalty be motivated by social and cultural identities transmitted across generations and collective memory? Eren Arbatli says "yes", analyzing the history of Sasun, a mountainous region of the Ottoman Empire located in Eastern Turkey.

On November 5-6, the 15th EIASM Conference on “Corporate Governance” took place in Brussels. Representatives of more than 15 countries came to the capital of Belgium to present their research projects and discuss new trends in the field of corporate finance.

This week Faculty of Economic Sciences hosted HSE and University of Vienna joint workshop on Information Acquisition, Diffusion and Disclosure in Markets.

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita studied deterrence in a world where attacks cannot be perfectly attributed to attackers. In his model, each of n attackers may attack the defender. The defender observes an imperfect signal that probabilistically attributes the attack. The defender may retaliate against one or more attackers, and wants to retaliate against the guilty attacker only. He uncover an endogenous strategic complementarity among the attackers: if one attacker becomes more aggressive, that attacker becomes more “suspect” and the other attackers become less suspect, which leads the other attackers to become more aggressive as well.