Публикации

The present article follows two objectives. First, to apply a recently developed spatial interaction model and discuss its power in explaining social developments. Second, to obtain information on internal migration'sdeterminants in Russia by taking into account that its eastern and western regions differ in many respects. Two alternative panel specifications are considered, labelled “spatial interaction specification with exogenous spatial lags” and “gravity-type specification with network effects”. While both specifications are designed to capture the impacts of neighbouring regions in migration dynamics, they differ with respect to the implementation of fixed effects. It is argued that neighbourhood impacts manifest themselves either as spillover effects, which amplify a variable's impact, or competition effects, which attenuate them. The results show that variables indeed differ from each other in these respects, demonstrating how migration patterns are subject to events beyond the directly involved regions, and that these are furthermore influenced by the distances between regions. In addition, the results provide further evidence that migration determinants differ for Eastern and Western Russia.

Глава анализирует влияние идей "Капитала" К. Маркса на  реформистское народничество,  "легальный марксизм" и катедер-социализм  в России.  Особое внимание уделено  острым дискуссиям о стадиях экономического развития России в сравнении с Западной Европой. 

How do elections and post-election protest shape political trust in a competitive autocracy? Taking advantage of largely exogenous variation in the timing of a survey conducted in Moscow in 2011, we find that an election had little systematic effect on political trust, perhaps because vote improprieties were not new information. In contrast, the unexpected protest that followed increased trust in government. We argue that when autocrats permit protest unexpectedly, citizens may update their beliefs about the trustworthiness of the government. In this case, heightened trust arises largely from opposition voters - those most likely to be surprised by permission to hold the protest - who update their beliefs. Our results suggest that citizens may cue not off the content of a protest, but off the government's decision to permit it. In addition, autocrats can increase trust in government by allowing protest when it is unexpected.

We develop a theory of equilibrium market volatility in a general equilibrium duopoly with complete information. The resulting economic system possesses a property, which can be described as ‘natural volatility’ of markets, even if players have complete information. Economy is described as a strategic market game where every player has market power as a buyer and a seller. Players are uncertain about each other’s actions, and due to the properties of expected utility maximization there is no convergence of common beliefs of common knowledge to unique mixed strategies equilibrium, hence, rational expectations approach cannot be applied.  Volatility at the market appears from a multiplicity of equilibrium mixed strategies; they cannot be computed precisely, but only approximated. We identify several Pareto-efficient strategies and study induced prices, allocations and payoffs, which are all volatile. 

The model of the real sector of the Russian economy is presented. It allows for the separate description of GDP and its components by expenditure both in constant and in current prices. Unlike standard macroeconomic models, the model proposed considers a set of Trader agents in addition to Producer agent. Traders are based on a set of CES-functions and allow to decompose the statistics available into a set of unobserved components. The Producer is based on a specific production function that performs well for Russian data and works with financial variables, such as credits and bank accounts. In contrary to the standard approach, the model is not linearized to get estimates of model parameters but is estimated directly using a set of nonlinear equations. The optimization is performed numerically and allows to get both series of unobserved model products and their prices and model parameters. The stability of the solution found is checked on simulated data.

We are constructing an imperfect competition general equilibrium model, with non-consumable money and labor market; our toolkit is an equilibrium default model of Shubik-Wilson (1978). Our result has an ‘equilibrium volatility’ simultaneously occurring at all three markets: labor, goods, and credit market, with a fixed money supply from a bank. A worker and an entrepreneur strategically and simultaneously trade at the three markets. Players are uncertain about each other’s actions, and do not have a convergence of common beliefs of common knowledge. It is impossible to calculate equilibrium mixed strategies exactly, but it is possible to identify some Pareto-efficient strategies and study induced prices, wages, interest rates, default, allocations and payoffs, which are all volatile, and their fluctuations are not independent. We present an equilibrium result, when a total value of default is bigger than total money supply.