декан — Замулин Олег Александрович
научный руководитель — Автономов Владимир Сергеевич
первый заместитель декана — Коссова Татьяна Владимировна
заместитель декана — Осипова Елена Ивановна
заместитель декана по научной работе — Карабекян Даниел Самвелович
заместитель декана по международным связям — Засимова Людмила Сергеевна
заместитель декана по работе со студентами — Бурмистрова Елена Борисовна
119049, Москва,
улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корп. 3 каб. 3305
(проезд: м. Шаболовская)
тел: (495) 628-83-68
Рассматривается вычисление индекса манипулируемости Нитцана-Келли в модели независимых анонимных и нейтральных предпочтений (IANC). Проведено теоретическое исследование модели, а также сделана оценка максимальной разницы индексов манипулируемости в данной модели и в базовой, модели независимых предпочтений (IC). Ассимптотическое поведение этой разности исследовано при помощи третей модели, независимых анонимных предпочтений (IAC). Показано, что максимальная разность индексов в моделях IAC и IANC стремится к нулю при числе избирателей, стремящемся к бесконечности. Результаты справедливы для любого другого вероятностного индекса, являющегося анонимным и нейтральным. Наконец, сделаны вычисления индекса Нитцана-Келли в модели IANC для четырех правил коллективного выбора, и проведено сравнение результатов с моделью IC.
Рассматривается вычисление индекса манипулируемости Нитцана-Келли в модели независимых анонимных и нейтральных предпочтений (IANC). Проведено теоретическое исследование модели, а также сделана оценка максимальной разницы индексов манипулируемости в данной модели и в базовой, модели независимых предпочтений (IC). Ассимптотическое поведение этой разности исследовано при помощи третей модели, независимых анонимных предпочтений (IAC). Показано, что максимальная разность индексов в моделях IAC и IANC стремится к нулю при числе избирателей, стремящемся к бесконечности. Результаты справедливы для любого другого вероятностного индекса, являющегося анонимным и нейтральным. Наконец, сделаны вычисления индекса Нитцана-Келли в модели IANC для четырех правил коллективного выбора, и проведено сравнение результатов с моделью IC.
Over the last few decades, performance-based funding models of universities have been introduced and have made universities build and implement different strategies to enable them to compete and be viable in changing circumstances. In turn, national governments are focused on providing universities with more opportunities to run efficient programmes that advance higher education. This paper includes a detailed review of various taxonomies for structuring university. More importantly, it develops a typology of higher education institutions that is relevant for the Russian context. The Ward method is used to cluster universities on the basis of university distinctions in terms of the availability of resources, education, and research and development. This typology of universities is verified by assessing their efficiency score gained from modified Data Envelopment Analysis,incorporating universities' heterogeneity. Finally, the paper gives a decision tree for classifying universities bearing in mind their diversity. It might be expanded for abroader set of inputs and outputs, namely external projectbased research funding modes and cooperation between universities and industry to pursue the development of innovation. The results can be used for shaping targeted policies aimed at particular university groups
Over the last few decades, performance-based funding models of universities have been introduced and have made universities build and implement different strategies to enable them to compete and be viable in changing circumstances. In turn, national governments are focused on providing universities with more opportunities to run efficient programmes that advance higher education. This paper includes a detailed review of various taxonomies for structuring university. More importantly, it develops a typology of higher education institutions that is relevant for the Russian context. The Ward method is used to cluster universities on the basis of university distinctions in terms of the availability of resources, education, and research and development. This typology of universities is verified by assessing their efficiency score gained from modified Data Envelopment Analysis,incorporating universities' heterogeneity. Finally, the paper gives a decision tree for classifying universities bearing in mind their diversity. It might be expanded for abroader set of inputs and outputs, namely external projectbased research funding modes and cooperation between universities and industry to pursue the development of innovation. The results can be used for shaping targeted policies aimed at particular university groups
The last couple of decades have witnessed significant institutional and structural changes in financial sector within a worldwide trend toward consolidation. In the segment of organized trading stock exchanges merge and develop into large and diversified publicly traded companies. These processes are rather complicated in case of a transition economy like Russia. In December 2011 MICEX, the first largest and state-controlled stock exchange acquired RTS, the second largest and privately owned stock exchange primarily designed for foreign investors. We empirically investigate whether the acquisition resulted in improved liquidity of the Russian stock market which was one of the declared acquisition objectives. We use the Kolmogorov–Smirnov and the Wilcoxon tests to compare market-wide liquidity in several discrete periods pre and post acquisition. A deep and thorough insight into liquidity performance is ensured by assessing liquidity from limit order book data of tick frequency along three dimensions (tightness, immediacy, and elasticity).
The last couple of decades have witnessed significant institutional and structural changes in financial sector within a worldwide trend toward consolidation. In the segment of organized trading stock exchanges merge and develop into large and diversified publicly traded companies. These processes are rather complicated in case of a transition economy like Russia. In December 2011 MICEX, the first largest and state-controlled stock exchange acquired RTS, the second largest and privately owned stock exchange primarily designed for foreign investors. We empirically investigate whether the acquisition resulted in improved liquidity of the Russian stock market which was one of the declared acquisition objectives. We use the Kolmogorov–Smirnov and the Wilcoxon tests to compare market-wide liquidity in several discrete periods pre and post acquisition. A deep and thorough insight into liquidity performance is ensured by assessing liquidity from limit order book data of tick frequency along three dimensions (tightness, immediacy, and elasticity).
We provide sharp error bounds for the difference between the transition densities of some multidimensional Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC) and the fundamental solutions of some fractional in time Partial (Integro) Differential Equations (P(I)DEs). Namely, we consider equations involving a time fractional derivative of Caputo type and a spatial operator corresponding to the generator of a non degenerate Brownian or stable driven Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE).
We provide sharp error bounds for the difference between the transition densities of some multidimensional Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC) and the fundamental solutions of some fractional in time Partial (Integro) Differential Equations (P(I)DEs). Namely, we consider equations involving a time fractional derivative of Caputo type and a spatial operator corresponding to the generator of a non degenerate Brownian or stable driven Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE).
Public sector project management in Russia is inefficiently carried out. One reason for this is an absence of generally accepted procedures for evaluating the performance of projects. In the framework of evaluating performance, there is the issue of evaluating the rate for discounting the anticipated benefits and costs of public projects to the present moment. This paper contains a methodology for estimating the social discount rate for cost–benefit analysis in various economic industries in Russia. We apply two approaches – social rate of time preferences and social opportunity cost of capital – and propose a methodology for projects related to any industry. We present examples of estimating the social discount rate for healthcare, education, social services, and infrastructure projects. Our results are useful when both the government and private firms are able to solve the same social problems. The findings are applicable for any country with unequal development of various economic industries.
Public sector project management in Russia is inefficiently carried out. One reason for this is an absence of generally accepted procedures for evaluating the performance of projects. In the framework of evaluating performance, there is the issue of evaluating the rate for discounting the anticipated benefits and costs of public projects to the present moment. This paper contains a methodology for estimating the social discount rate for cost–benefit analysis in various economic industries in Russia. We apply two approaches – social rate of time preferences and social opportunity cost of capital – and propose a methodology for projects related to any industry. We present examples of estimating the social discount rate for healthcare, education, social services, and infrastructure projects. Our results are useful when both the government and private firms are able to solve the same social problems. The findings are applicable for any country with unequal development of various economic industries.
We investigate models with negative risk sums when the company invests its reserve into a risky asset whose price follows a geometric Brownian motion. Our main result is an exact asymptotic of the ruin probabilities for the case of exponentially distributed benefits. As in the case of non-life insurance with exponential claims, the ruin probabilities are either decreasing with a rate given by a power function (the case of small volatility) or equal to one identically (the case of large volatility). The result allows us to quantify the share of reserve to invest into such a risky asset to avoid a catastrophic outcome, namely the ruin with probability one. We address also the question of smoothness of the ruin probabilities as a function of the initial reserve for generally distributed jumps.
We investigate models with negative risk sums when the company invests its reserve into a risky asset whose price follows a geometric Brownian motion. Our main result is an exact asymptotic of the ruin probabilities for the case of exponentially distributed benefits. As in the case of non-life insurance with exponential claims, the ruin probabilities are either decreasing with a rate given by a power function (the case of small volatility) or equal to one identically (the case of large volatility). The result allows us to quantify the share of reserve to invest into such a risky asset to avoid a catastrophic outcome, namely the ruin with probability one. We address also the question of smoothness of the ruin probabilities as a function of the initial reserve for generally distributed jumps.
This paper seeks answers to two questions. First, if a greater social activity of an individual enhances oblique (i.e. to non-relatives) transmission of her cultural traits at the expense of vertical (i.e. to children) transmission as well as family size, which behavior is optimal from cultural evolution standpoint? I formalize a general model that characterizes evolutionarily stable social activity. The proposed model replicates the theory of Newson et al. (2007) that fertility decline is caused by increasing role of oblique cultural transmission. Second, if social activity is a rational choice rather than a culturally inherited trait, and if cultural transmission acts on preferences rather than behaviors, which preferences survive the process of cultural evolution? I arrive at a very simple yet powerful result: under mild assumptions on model structure, only preferences which emphasize exclusively the concern for social prestige, i.e. extent to which one’s cultural trait has been picked up by others, survive.
This paper seeks answers to two questions. First, if a greater social activity of an individual enhances oblique (i.e. to non-relatives) transmission of her cultural traits at the expense of vertical (i.e. to children) transmission as well as family size, which behavior is optimal from cultural evolution standpoint? I formalize a general model that characterizes evolutionarily stable social activity. The proposed model replicates the theory of Newson et al. (2007) that fertility decline is caused by increasing role of oblique cultural transmission. Second, if social activity is a rational choice rather than a culturally inherited trait, and if cultural transmission acts on preferences rather than behaviors, which preferences survive the process of cultural evolution? I arrive at a very simple yet powerful result: under mild assumptions on model structure, only preferences which emphasize exclusively the concern for social prestige, i.e. extent to which one’s cultural trait has been picked up by others, survive.
This paper aims to explain the impact of the incentives of competition authorities concerning antitrust enforcement on the structure of enforcement and understanding of the substantive norms and welfare standards in Russia using case-level evidence.
Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on a unique dataset of appeals to infringement decisions in 2008–2012. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are applied to derive an understanding of the targets of competition policy in the practice of enforcement.
Findings – The analysis reveals that the majority of cases would never be investigated under conventional understanding of the goals of antitrust enforcement. It is also shown that antitrust authorities tend to investigate cases that require less input but result in infringement decisions with lower probability of being annulled and lower cost to proceed. Structure of enforcement is skewed towards cases where harm serves as independent and sufficient evidence of competition law violation.
Originality/value – The results show that it is dangerous to motivate authority and public servants based either on number of tasks completed or completeness of tasks when they are heterogeneous in terms of difficulty and where easier ones provide lower positive effects on welfare. Judicial reviews may poorly contribute to performance measurement under a discretionary choice of enforcement targets.
This paper aims to explain the impact of the incentives of competition authorities concerning antitrust enforcement on the structure of enforcement and understanding of the substantive norms and welfare standards in Russia using case-level evidence.
Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on a unique dataset of appeals to infringement decisions in 2008–2012. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are applied to derive an understanding of the targets of competition policy in the practice of enforcement.
Findings – The analysis reveals that the majority of cases would never be investigated under conventional understanding of the goals of antitrust enforcement. It is also shown that antitrust authorities tend to investigate cases that require less input but result in infringement decisions with lower probability of being annulled and lower cost to proceed. Structure of enforcement is skewed towards cases where harm serves as independent and sufficient evidence of competition law violation.
Originality/value – The results show that it is dangerous to motivate authority and public servants based either on number of tasks completed or completeness of tasks when they are heterogeneous in terms of difficulty and where easier ones provide lower positive effects on welfare. Judicial reviews may poorly contribute to performance measurement under a discretionary choice of enforcement targets.
We obtain sufficient conditions for the differentiability of solutions to stationary Fokker--Planck--Kolmogorov equations with respect to a parameter. In particular, this gives conditions for the differentiability of stationary distributions of diffusion processes with respect to a parameter.
This article examines the interconnection between national intelligence, political institutions, and the mismanagement of public resources (deforestations). The paper examines the reasons for deforestation and investigates the factors accountable for it. The analysis builds on authors-compiled cross-national dataset on 185 countries over the time period of twenty years, from 1990 to 2010. We find that, first, nation’s intelligence reduces significantly the level of deforestation in a state. Moreover, the nations’ IQ seems to play an offsetting role in the natural resource conservation (forest management) in the countries with weak democratic institutions. The analysis also discovered the presence of the U-shaped relationship between democracy and deforestation. Intelligence sheds more light on this interconnection and explains the results. Our results are robust to various sample selection strategies and model specifications. The main implication from our study is that intelligence not only shapes formal rules and informal regulations such as social trust, norms and traditions but also it has the ability to reverse the paradoxical process known as “resource curse.” The study contributes to better understanding of reasons of deforestation and shed light on the debated impact of political regime on forest management.
This article examines the interconnection between national intelligence, political institutions, and the mismanagement of public resources (deforestations). The paper examines the reasons for deforestation and investigates the factors accountable for it. The analysis builds on authors-compiled cross-national dataset on 185 countries over the time period of twenty years, from 1990 to 2010. We find that, first, nation’s intelligence reduces significantly the level of deforestation in a state. Moreover, the nations’ IQ seems to play an offsetting role in the natural resource conservation (forest management) in the countries with weak democratic institutions. The analysis also discovered the presence of the U-shaped relationship between democracy and deforestation. Intelligence sheds more light on this interconnection and explains the results. Our results are robust to various sample selection strategies and model specifications. The main implication from our study is that intelligence not only shapes formal rules and informal regulations such as social trust, norms and traditions but also it has the ability to reverse the paradoxical process known as “resource curse.” The study contributes to better understanding of reasons of deforestation and shed light on the debated impact of political regime on forest management.
A model of demand for parking, evolving over time, is proposed. The model features both extensive (whether to park) and intensive (for how long to park) margins of parking demand, allows multidimensional heterogeneity of parkers, and evolution of demand throughout the day. I show that the optimal price for parking is proportional to the rate of arrival of new parkers and is inversely related to the square of the occupancy rate, which is different from previously discussed pricing methods. I show that the primary purpose of pricing is to regulate departures, rather than arrivals, of parkers. I also find that asymmetric information about parkers’ characteristics does not prevent the parking authority from achieving the social optimum. A numerical example compares the optimal policy against the alternatives.
A model of demand for parking, evolving over time, is proposed. The model features both extensive (whether to park) and intensive (for how long to park) margins of parking demand, allows multidimensional heterogeneity of parkers, and evolution of demand throughout the day. I show that the optimal price for parking is proportional to the rate of arrival of new parkers and is inversely related to the square of the occupancy rate, which is different from previously discussed pricing methods. I show that the primary purpose of pricing is to regulate departures, rather than arrivals, of parkers. I also find that asymmetric information about parkers’ characteristics does not prevent the parking authority from achieving the social optimum. A numerical example compares the optimal policy against the alternatives.
This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the e§ort e§ect working against giving preferences and the selection e§ect working for them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the U.S.), the selection e§ect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.
This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the e§ort e§ect working against giving preferences and the selection e§ect working for them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the U.S.), the selection e§ect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.
We prove pathwise uniqueness for a class of stochastic differential equations (SDE) on a Hilbert space with cylindrical Wiener noise, whose nonlinear drift parts are sums of the sub-differential of a convex function and a bounded part. This generalizes a classical result by one of the authors to infinite dimensions. Our results also generalize and improve recent results by N. Champagnat and P. E. Jabin, proved in finite dimensions, in the case where their diffusion matrix is constant and nondegenerate and their weakly differentiable drift is the (weak) gradient of a convex function. We also prove weak existence, hence obtain unique strong solutions by the Yamada–Watanabe theorem. The proofs are based in part on a recent maximal regularity result in infinite dimensions, the theory of quasi-regular Dirichlet forms and an infinite dimensional version of a Zvonkin-type transformation. As a main application, we show pathwise uniqueness for stochastic reaction diffusion equations perturbed by a Borel measurable bounded drift. Hence, such SDE have a unique strong solution.
We prove pathwise uniqueness for a class of stochastic differential equations (SDE) on a Hilbert space with cylindrical Wiener noise, whose nonlinear drift parts are sums of the sub-differential of a convex function and a bounded part. This generalizes a classical result by one of the authors to infinite dimensions. Our results also generalize and improve recent results by N. Champagnat and P. E. Jabin, proved in finite dimensions, in the case where their diffusion matrix is constant and nondegenerate and their weakly differentiable drift is the (weak) gradient of a convex function. We also prove weak existence, hence obtain unique strong solutions by the Yamada–Watanabe theorem. The proofs are based in part on a recent maximal regularity result in infinite dimensions, the theory of quasi-regular Dirichlet forms and an infinite dimensional version of a Zvonkin-type transformation. As a main application, we show pathwise uniqueness for stochastic reaction diffusion equations perturbed by a Borel measurable bounded drift. Hence, such SDE have a unique strong solution.
We provide a game-theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a Bayesian voter. The latter is uncertain about how good the candidates are. Candidates take unobservable, costly actions to manipulate voter's opinion about their positions. We show that if the candidates differ in campaigning efficiency, and the voter receives the biased campaign messages with some noise, then the cost-efficient candidate can win the election with higher probability than her opponent even when she is ex-post an inferior choice for the voter.Our paper offers a novel informational justification for imposing limits on campaign spending and encouraging diversity in the supply of political information.
We provide a game-theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a Bayesian voter. The latter is uncertain about how good the candidates are. Candidates take unobservable, costly actions to manipulate voter's opinion about their positions. We show that if the candidates differ in campaigning efficiency, and the voter receives the biased campaign messages with some noise, then the cost-efficient candidate can win the election with higher probability than her opponent even when she is ex-post an inferior choice for the voter.Our paper offers a novel informational justification for imposing limits on campaign spending and encouraging diversity in the supply of political information.
The effects of autonomous vehicles (AVs) on urban forms are modeled, calibrated, and analyzed. Vehicles are used for commute between peripheral home and central work, and require land for parking. An advantage of AVs is that they can optimize the location of day parking, relieving downtown land for other uses. They also reduce the per-kilometer cost of commute. Increased AV availability increases worker welfare, travel distances, and the city size. Land rents increase in the center but decrease in the periphery. Possible locations of AV daytime parking are analyzed. The effects of AV introduction on traffic and on mass transit coverage are discussed.
The effects of autonomous vehicles (AVs) on urban forms are modeled, calibrated, and analyzed. Vehicles are used for commute between peripheral home and central work, and require land for parking. An advantage of AVs is that they can optimize the location of day parking, relieving downtown land for other uses. They also reduce the per-kilometer cost of commute. Increased AV availability increases worker welfare, travel distances, and the city size. Land rents increase in the center but decrease in the periphery. Possible locations of AV daytime parking are analyzed. The effects of AV introduction on traffic and on mass transit coverage are discussed.
We contribute to the financial constraints literature and the investment-cash flow sensitivity debate by defining a new and simple index of firm level financial constraints for unquoted European SMEs. Firms that are constrained according to our index pay higher interest rates on their debt. An exogenous financial supply shock reveals that our index also captures financial constraints in terms of the volume of credit. Our index outperforms existing indices in capturing financial constraints of unquoted SMEs. Finally, employing our proposed index to identify financially constrained firms and using firm-level employment growth as a control for investment opportunities, we find that constrained firms display the highest investment-cash flow sensitivities.
We contribute to the financial constraints literature and the investment-cash flow sensitivity debate by defining a new and simple index of firm level financial constraints for unquoted European SMEs. Firms that are constrained according to our index pay higher interest rates on their debt. An exogenous financial supply shock reveals that our index also captures financial constraints in terms of the volume of credit. Our index outperforms existing indices in capturing financial constraints of unquoted SMEs. Finally, employing our proposed index to identify financially constrained firms and using firm-level employment growth as a control for investment opportunities, we find that constrained firms display the highest investment-cash flow sensitivities.
Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate mobile telecom spectrum. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that bidding truthfully does not constitute an equilibrium if bidders also have an incentive to engage in spiteful bidding to raise rivals' cost. The restrictions on further bids imposed by the clock phase of a CCA give certainty to bidders that certain bids above value cannot be winning bids, assisting bidders to engage in spiteful bidding.
Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate mobile telecom spectrum. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that bidding truthfully does not constitute an equilibrium if bidders also have an incentive to engage in spiteful bidding to raise rivals' cost. The restrictions on further bids imposed by the clock phase of a CCA give certainty to bidders that certain bids above value cannot be winning bids, assisting bidders to engage in spiteful bidding.
A tool for quantitatively analyzing perspectives of investing in a regional electrical grid that allows regional authorities to estimate (a) the level of potential investments in developing this system, and (b) the volumes and the prices of electricity to be provided for the population and for the industry in the region (in the framework of this system) in a certain period of time in the future (as a result of these investments) is presented. The problem of estimating such perspectives is modeled as a static, two-person, non-cooperative game on disjoint polyhedra with the payoff functions being a sum of a bilinear and a linear function of vector arguments (for the first player), and a bilinear function of the same vector arguments (for the second player). It is proved that equilibria in this game, which determine (a) optimal investment strategies proceeding from financial capabilities of the electricity producers in the region and their ability to borrow money from external investors, and (b) electricity prices expected to be mutually acceptable to both the consumers and the producers of electricity in the developed electrical grid, can be found by solving linear programming problems forming a dual pair. An illustrative numerical example of developing the proposed game model and calculating both optimal investment strategies and equilibrium electricity prices is considered.
A tool for quantitatively analyzing perspectives of investing in a regional electrical grid that allows regional authorities to estimate (a) the level of potential investments in developing this system, and (b) the volumes and the prices of electricity to be provided for the population and for the industry in the region (in the framework of this system) in a certain period of time in the future (as a result of these investments) is presented. The problem of estimating such perspectives is modeled as a static, two-person, non-cooperative game on disjoint polyhedra with the payoff functions being a sum of a bilinear and a linear function of vector arguments (for the first player), and a bilinear function of the same vector arguments (for the second player). It is proved that equilibria in this game, which determine (a) optimal investment strategies proceeding from financial capabilities of the electricity producers in the region and their ability to borrow money from external investors, and (b) electricity prices expected to be mutually acceptable to both the consumers and the producers of electricity in the developed electrical grid, can be found by solving linear programming problems forming a dual pair. An illustrative numerical example of developing the proposed game model and calculating both optimal investment strategies and equilibrium electricity prices is considered.
We provide a game-theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a Bayesian voter. The latter is uncertain about how good the candidates are. Candidates take unobservable, costly actions to manipulate voter's opinion about their positions. We show that if the candidates differ in campaigning efficiency, and the voter receives the biased campaign messages with some noise, then the cost-efficient candidate can win the election with higher probability than her opponent even when she is ex-post an inferior choice for the voter.Our paper offers a novel informational justification for imposing limits on campaign spending and encouraging diversity in the supply of political information.
The effects of autonomous vehicles (AVs) on urban forms are modeled, calibrated, and analyzed. Vehicles are used for commute between peripheral home and central work, and require land for parking. An advantage of AVs is that they can optimize the location of day parking, relieving downtown land for other uses. They also reduce the per-kilometer cost of commute. Increased AV availability increases worker welfare, travel distances, and the city size. Land rents increase in the center but decrease in the periphery. Possible locations of AV daytime parking are analyzed. The effects of AV introduction on traffic and on mass transit coverage are discussed.
Translational diffusion is the most fundamental form of transport in chemical and biological systems. The diffusion coefficient is highly sensitive to changes in the size of the diffusing species; hence, it provides important information on the variety of macromolecular processes, such as self-assembly or folding-unfolding. Here, we investigate the behavior of the diffusion coefficient of a macromolecule in the vicinity of heat-induced transition from folded to unfolded state. We derive the equation that describes the diffusion coefficient of the macromolecule in the vicinity of the transition and use it to fit the experimental data from pulsed-field-gradient nuclear magnetic resonance (PFG NMR) experiments acquired for two globular proteins, lysozyme and RNase A, undergoing temperature-induced unfolding. A very good qualitative agreement between the theoretically derived diffusion coefficient and experimental data is observed.
Translational diffusion is the most fundamental form of transport in chemical and biological systems. The diffusion coefficient is highly sensitive to changes in the size of the diffusing species; hence, it provides important information on the variety of macromolecular processes, such as self-assembly or folding-unfolding. Here, we investigate the behavior of the diffusion coefficient of a macromolecule in the vicinity of heat-induced transition from folded to unfolded state. We derive the equation that describes the diffusion coefficient of the macromolecule in the vicinity of the transition and use it to fit the experimental data from pulsed-field-gradient nuclear magnetic resonance (PFG NMR) experiments acquired for two globular proteins, lysozyme and RNase A, undergoing temperature-induced unfolding. A very good qualitative agreement between the theoretically derived diffusion coefficient and experimental data is observed.
We contribute to the financial constraints literature and the investment-cash flow sensitivity debate by defining a new and simple index of firm level financial constraints for unquoted European SMEs. Firms that are constrained according to our index pay higher interest rates on their debt. An exogenous financial supply shock reveals that our index also captures financial constraints in terms of the volume of credit. Our index outperforms existing indices in capturing financial constraints of unquoted SMEs. Finally, employing our proposed index to identify financially constrained firms and using firm-level employment growth as a control for investment opportunities, we find that constrained firms display the highest investment-cash flow sensitivities.
We review our recent results concerning the propagation of “quasi-particles” in hybrid spaces — topological spaces obtained from graphs via replacing their vertices by Riemannian manifolds. Although the problem is purely classical, it is initiated by the quantum one, namely, by the Cauchy problem for the time-dependent Schrödinger equation with localized initial data.We describe connections between the behavior of quasi-particles with the properties of the corresponding geodesic flows. We also describe connections of our problem with various problems in analytic number theory.
We review our recent results concerning the propagation of “quasi-particles” in hybrid spaces — topological spaces obtained from graphs via replacing their vertices by Riemannian manifolds. Although the problem is purely classical, it is initiated by the quantum one, namely, by the Cauchy problem for the time-dependent Schrödinger equation with localized initial data.We describe connections between the behavior of quasi-particles with the properties of the corresponding geodesic flows. We also describe connections of our problem with various problems in analytic number theory.
A tool for quantitatively analyzing perspectives of investing in a regional electrical grid that allows regional authorities to estimate (a) the level of potential investments in developing this system, and (b) the volumes and the prices of electricity to be provided for the population and for the industry in the region (in the framework of this system) in a certain period of time in the future (as a result of these investments) is presented. The problem of estimating such perspectives is modeled as a static, two-person, non-cooperative game on disjoint polyhedra with the payoff functions being a sum of a bilinear and a linear function of vector arguments (for the first player), and a bilinear function of the same vector arguments (for the second player). It is proved that equilibria in this game, which determine (a) optimal investment strategies proceeding from financial capabilities of the electricity producers in the region and their ability to borrow money from external investors, and (b) electricity prices expected to be mutually acceptable to both the consumers and the producers of electricity in the developed electrical grid, can be found by solving linear programming problems forming a dual pair. An illustrative numerical example of developing the proposed game model and calculating both optimal investment strategies and equilibrium electricity prices is considered.
Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate mobile telecom spectrum. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that bidding truthfully does not constitute an equilibrium if bidders also have an incentive to engage in spiteful bidding to raise rivals' cost. The restrictions on further bids imposed by the clock phase of a CCA give certainty to bidders that certain bids above value cannot be winning bids, assisting bidders to engage in spiteful bidding.