119049, Moscow, 26 Shabolovka Ulitsa, Room 5414;
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90*26068, 26070;
Fuad T. Aleskerov
Tatiana Georgievna Pitra
Alexander S. Belenky.
Myachin A. L.
Automation and Remote Control. 2019. Vol. 80. No. 1. P. 112-123.
Meshcheryakova N. G.
In bk.: Studies in Computational Intelligence. Vol. 813: Complex Networks and Their Applications VII. Prt. 2. Springer, 2019. Ch. 7. P. 80-90.
Zlotnik A., Lomonosov T.
arxiv.org. math. Cornell University, 2018
Moderators: Alexei Zakharov (HSE), Konstantin Sonin (HSE, The University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy)
Upcoming seminar - April 23, 17:00
the joint seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy, International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interaction (NES CSDSI)
Speaker: Kemal Kıvanç Aköz (HSE)
Topic: Preemptive versus Counter Offers
We consider an ultimatum-game setup, which has two key non-standard features: (1) The responder has an initial fallback position, which is her private information (except for the complete-information case), and (2) she can improve her initial fallback position further by means of a costly investment, which does not improve the joint surplus and thus is a deadweight loss. There are two sources of inefficiency: disagreement possibility and the deadweight-loss investment. The proposer ends up either making a counter offer to the responder after finding out the responder's type as well as her best outside offer or makes a particular preemptive offer before her investment and thus before the uncertainty about her type is not resolved (except for the incomplete-information case). Thus, any preemptive offer aims for agreement before investment, which, if accepted, avoids the deadweight-loss investment, and thus inefficiency; if rejected, it always leads to inefficiency as players receive their fallback payoffs. A counter offer, on the other hand, always guarantees agreement, but only after investment cost is incurred, and thus it is inefficient. We consider the complete-information as well as the no- and noisy-information cases. We find that in the complete-information case the unique equilibrium offer is a preemptive offer which always achieves efficiency and leads to agreement. In the other cases, if the proposer's (prior or posterior) belief about the responder's type is not precise enough, he might prefer to wait to make a counter offer until after the responder makes her investment and receives outside offers. It turns out that more precise information reduces both types of inefficiency by leading to preemptive offers which are accepted with higher probability. We also show that our results are robust to various extensions such as risk aversion by players, multiple offers by the proposer, continuum of responder types and type-dependent investment costs.
Address: The HSE building at Shabolovka (ul. Shabolovka 26-5, room 5409).
If you don't have a HSE picture ID, please contact email@example.com to order a pass for the seminar before 12:00 on the day of the seminar.
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