109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Edited by: F. T. Aleskerov, А. А. Васин.
Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020.
Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.
Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.
Lepskiy A., Meshcheryakova N.
In bk.: Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems. IPMU 2020. Vol. 1238. Prt. 2. Cham: Springer, 2020. P. 283-296.
Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.
Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.
Moderators: Alexei Zakharov (HSE), Konstantin Sonin (HSE, University of Chicago)
Upcoming seminar - 26 May
the joint seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy, International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interaction (NES CSDSI)
Speaker: Georgiy Syunyaev (Columbia University)
Topic: Public attribution of responsibility in autocracies: Evidence from Russia
Correct attribution of responsibility for economic outcomes is one of the key assumptions underlying citizens’ ability to hold politicians accountable: Correct attribution allows citizens to use punishment and reward strategies to discipline politicians and to prevent them from introducing policies that contravene the preferences of the electoral majority (Ferejohn, 1986; Fiorina, 1981). Even in contexts with formal, legal mechanisms of accountability and a putatively free media, citizens often fail to correctly punish and/or reward politicians for economic performance. Among the reasons for the absence of correct blame attribution—even in its most propitious circumstances—scholars highlight scarce or biased information (Alcañiz and Hellwig, 2011), perceptual biases of voters (Bullock, 2011), and diffuse structures of responsibilities in multilevel governments (Malhotra and Kuo, 2008; Reuter and Beazer, 2016).
This study examines whether and how contents of media reporting affect citizens’ perception of public policy outcomes, responsibility for those outcomes and evaluation of the politicians in non-democratic context in 4 Siberian regions of Russia: Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Kemerovo and Krasnoyarsk. I analyze data from an original survey experiment in which respondents are asked to watch video excerpts from "Rossia 1" news reports that aim to inform citizens about responsibility for recent policy outcomes. Respondents are then asked to evaluate the outcomes of various economic policies as well as performance of different levels of government. The design allows me to learn whether popularity of the government in countries without strong democratic traditions and vibrant media can be predicated on strategic and potentially biased framing of the news. One unique feature of this study is its on allocation of responsibility between multiple tiers of the government. This feature allows me to test ability of citizens to correctly attribute responsibility in multi-level government structures — important but empirically understudied aspect of political accountability in comparative context.
Seminar is held in online format.
Past MeetingsFall-Winter-Spring 2019-2020
Hiding Behind Fig Leaves – The Economic Consequences of Moral Hypocrisy
Austin L. Wright (Harris School of Public Policy, The University of Chicago) Civilian Abuse and Wartime Informing
Julian G. Waller (George Washington University & Higher School of Economics)Popular Perceptions and the De Facto Role of Political Parties in the Euromaidan Protests of 2013-2014
Lauren A. McCarthy (University of Massachusetts Amherst) Managed Civil Society and the Realities of Police Oversight in Russia
Philippe Gagnepain (Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1-Ecole d’Economie de Paris)
Full versus binary menus: What are the welfare gains?
Maria Snegovaya (Columbia University)
The Left Parties Choices and The Emergence of The Radical Right
1. Speaker: Jeroen van de Ven (Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam)
Topic: "Once a Cheater Always a Cheater? An Experimental Study on the Persistence of Lying "2. Speaker: Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS – University of Lyon)
Topic: "Can transparency of information reduce embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania"abstracts